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In light of recent developments in auction theory, this Article re-examines
Delaware corporate law governing directors' actions when structuring the sale
ofa corporation. A foundational doctrine ofDelaware law is that when the board
of directors resolves to sell a corporation, it must obtain the highest price
reasonably available. Auction theory posits that, in certain circumstances
germane to corporate takeovers, revenues can be maximized through the use of
ex ante precommitments to the rules ofthe auction. Delaware law, however, does
not fully endorse directors' ability to make such precommitments, primarily out
of the concern that the board will lock up a transaction for self-interested
reasons.
The Article's core claim is that current Delaware law is unduly averse to
precommitment devices that set the rules ofthe game in corporate auctions. Such
devices can help maximize shareholder value and do not create the positional
conflict that animates much of corporate takeover jurisprudence. Courts should
draw a distinction between ex ante precommitments, characterized by
ambivalence concerning the identity of the winning bidders, versus midstream
or ex post lock-ups, in which the board favors a known buyer.
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Introduction
When a board of directors resolves to sell the corporation, it must structure
the sale so as to obtain the highest price reasonably available. In the landmark
case Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court held that, when a sale of the corporation becomes inevitable, the
"directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders . . . ."' Post-Revlon,
auctions2 have become a pervasive feature of the modem takeover landscape.3
Indeed, a recent survey of four hundred large-scale takeovers with a total deal
value of over $1 trillion found that over half of the sales involved a process of
competitive bidding rather than private negotiations with selected buyers.4
Yet, Delaware corporate law currently leaves in doubt the legality of a tool
useful to the value-maximizing auctioneer: the ability to pre-commit to the rules
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S 1. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). This Article follows standard practice within the
literature by focusing on Delaware corporate law due to the jurisdiction's status as the national leader in
corporate matters. The arguments presented herein are generalizable to any jurisdiction whose law
imposes Revlon-like obligations on corporate fiduciaries.
2. As used herein, "auction" refers generally to any competitive bidding process, as
opposed to private negotiations between a buyer and seller. The related term "structured sale" or
"structured auction" (used interchangeably herein) refers to a competitive bidding process in which the
rules of the game differ from the standard ascending-price auction described in Part 1.
3. Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 REv.
FIN. STUD. 1399, 1399 (2006) ("Selling finns by inviting competitive bids has become increasingly
popular in practice .... .").




of the auction.' In-a series of recent cases, the Delaware courts have struggled
with the fiduciary propriety of these precommitments and have reached
ambiguous and sometimes contradictory decisions.6 Indeed, one Vice-
Chancellor questioned, in dicta, whether such agreements are ever enforceable.7
Looming over these cases is the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., which forbids a target (i.e., selling)
board from fully locking up a transaction with a particular counterparty. Instead,
the board is legally obliged to include a "fiduciary out" clause in the acquisition
agreement, which contractually preserves the target board's right to cancel the
agreement should it subsequently receive a better offer.9
Such restriction, which in other work I term the fiduciary precommitment
constraint,10 would likely foreclose the use of First Price Sealed Bid ("FPSB")
auctions, in which bidders agree to make their best and final offers and the seller
agrees that the highest bidder wins the auction at the price bid. Absent the seller's
ability to credibly commit to those rules, bidders will alter their strategies.
Specifically, as the losing bidders can simply top the winning bidder after the
initial auction ends, the bidders will treat the structured sales process as if it were
a standard ascending price auction (also known as an "English" auction), in
which bidders iteratively increase their offering prices until only one bidder
remains. Auction theory, the branch of applied economics that studies auction
design, posits that English auctions are not necessarily optimal from the seller's
perspective." Thus, modem auction theory finds itself at odds with Delaware
takeover jurisprudence.
This tension is particularly problematic because the Delaware courts derive
both of these aspects of Delaware law, i.e., the value maximization mandate and
the restrictions on precommitments, from principles of fiduciary obligation.12
Takeovers are one of the most important events in the life cycle of a corporation
and are of particular financial significance to the corporation's shareholders. The
5. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of
Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CoRP. L. 1, 26 (2003) (noting that Delaware merger and acquisition
jurisprudence exhibits "hostility to precommitment strategies"); Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at 1412
("The ability to credibly commit to the [auction] procedure is, of course, central to its success in extracting
the highest possible transaction price.").
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. In re RehabCare Grp., Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, tr. at 46 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 8, 2011).
8. 818 A.2d 914, 938-39 (Del. 2003) (holding that a fully locked-up merger was void
as a per se violation of the target board's fiduciary obligations).
9. Id. at 938 ("We hold that the NCS board did not have authority to accede to the
Genesis demand for an absolute 'lock-up'. . . . Instead of agreeing to the absolute defense of the Genesis
merger from a superior offer, however, the NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to
protect the NCS stockholders if the Genesis transaction became an inferior offer.").
10. See Jay B Kesten, Shareholder Political Primacy, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REV.
(forthcoming Sept. 2015); Jay B Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder Bylaw
Power, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 485, 498 (2013).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part III.A-B.
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value-maximization norm acknowledges that a sale of the company represents
shareholders' last chance to receive a premium price for their equity. The
restriction on precommitments is a prophylactic rule, which prevents potentially
unfaithful directors from locking up transactions motivated by self-interest. Thus
far, Delaware courts have struggled to balance these competing policy
considerations and have failed to provide a principled standard for eviewing
directors' decisions when conducting a corporate auction.13
This Article develops a theoretically rigorous position on the use of ex ante
precommitment devices to facilitate value-maximizing corporate sales. In
particular, this Article synthesizes recent developments in auction theory, which
models optimal auction mechanism design (but pays little attention to the
dynamics of fiduciary obligation), with sensitivity to the need for judicial
oversight of corporate fiduciary behavior in the high-stakes context of corporate
mergers and acquisitions. The notion that corporate precommitment devices can,
in the abstract, create value is not novel. Other commentators have examined the
merits of commitment strategies in several corporate law contexts, such as
merger lock-ups,14 anti-takeover devices,5 and board governance.1 6 However,
there has been no sustained effort to analyze the merits of ex ante
precommitments to the rules of the auction itself and, in particular, the use of
contractual precommitment devices to simulate FPSB auctions.'7
This Article's core claim is that Delaware corporate law should allow
neutral ex ante precommitment devices that facilitate a FPSB auction, as such
mechanisms can maximize shareholder value and do not create the positional
conflict that animates much of Delaware's takeover jurisprudence. Courts should
draw a principled distinction between ex ante precommitments, characterized by
ambivalence concerning the identity of the winning bidders, versus midstream
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 605-13 (2004) (applying game theory to model the
economic benefits of offering deal lock-ups during the course of merger negotiations).
15. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 22-23 (discussing anti-takeover mechanisms, such as
"fair price shark repellents" and nonredeemable poison pills, as precommitment devices); Marcel Kahan
& Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 476 (2003) (arguing that "shareholders may rationally entrench board power [with
respect o negotiating takeovers and adopting takeover defenses] because shareholders ontheir own cannot
pursue an effective selling strategy").
16. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2004)
(arguing that "investors may be serving their own interests by binding themselves to board [governance]").
17. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Overview of Process Issues in Going Private
Transaction, in GOING PRIVATE 2011: DOING THE DEAL RIGHT 52 (2011) (querying whether "an auction
or quasi-auction process [that] contractually obligates bidders not to overbid . . . is . . . enforceable. . .");
Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 477 (noting that the process of "devising and implementing a selling
strategy . . . has not been properly emphasized in the takeover literature"). One notable exception is
Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a Sale of
Corporate Control, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 521,527-31 (2013), which discusses ome aspects of auction
theory in the takeover context. This Article differs significantly from Professor Sautter's contribution as




or ex post lock-ups, in which the board favors a known buyer. The latter should
be subjected to the more searching analysis governing takeover defenses and deal
protection devices; the former should be governed only by Revlon's range of
reasonableness review and not the more rigid frameworks set out in
Unocal/Unitrin (which bars deal protection devices that are either coercive or
preclusive) or Omnicare (i.e., the fiduciary precommitment constraint described
above). 18
Resolving these issues is both timely and necessary in light of recent efforts
by target boards to simulate FPSB auctions via intricate contractual agreements
with potential bidders.19 Briefly, targets require bidders to sign a "standstill"
agreement in order to gain access to the target's confidential financial (or other)
information prior to commencing the auction process. The standstill prohibits
losing bidders from making subsequent bids. One particularly strong form of
standstill, termed a "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" agreement, prevents bidders from
even requesting that the target board waive the no-subsequent-bids condition.20
As noted above, the Delaware Chancery Court has wrestled with the interplay
between these standstills and target boards' fiduciary obligations, but it has
reached varying (and limited) conclusions as to the propriety of target boards'
conduct.21 The Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue squarely,
but its fiduciary precommitment jurisprudence casts substantial-and, in my
view, improper-doubt on the legality of these structures.
Before proceeding, several caveats are in order concerning the scope of this
Article and its claims. First, this Article does not attempt to resolve the ongoing
uncertainty about which transactions trigger Revlon obligations. While
subsequent cases attempt to draw those boundaries,22 several commentators
18. See Part III.A-B for more detail on these lines of cases.
19. Both judges and academic commentators have noted the increasing importance of
these contractual devices. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Court's Ruling,
In re Ancestry.com S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS at 19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (remarking that
judicial review of these agreements was an important "emerging issue" for corporate law); Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 659 (2004)
("Surprisingly, despite their important implications for the interplay between negotiated and hostile
acquisitions, standstill agreements have not received attention from modem academic commentators.").
20. See Part IlI.C. for a more detailed treatment of these contractual arrangements.
21. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings. Inc., C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL
2181518, at *19-20 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (finding that standstill agreement contributed to
unreasonableness of board conduct); Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Court's Ruling,
In re Ancestry.com S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (advising, without deciding, that standstill
agreement was not per se invalid but cautioning against improper use); Telephonic Oral Argument and
the Court's Ruling, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov.
27, 2012) (enjoining enforcement of standstill agreement).
22. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc'y for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del.
1994) (holding that Revlon applies "in at least the following three scenarios: (1) when a corporation
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear break-up of the company; (2) where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term
strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company; or (3) when approval
of a transaction results in a sale or change of control") (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
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observe that the categories remain far from clear.2 3 This Article sets aside that
doctrinal dispute: the discussion herein assumes Revlon's applicability, i.e., that
the board is obliged to conduct a value-maximizing sale. Second, this Article
takes no position on the normative desirability of Revlon's value-maximization
principle, which has been challenged, especially in the financial literature, on
grounds of allocative efficiency.2 4 The analysis herein adopts the traditional
corporate law perspective that directors' fiduciary obligations in this context run
to the shareholders alone and do not require them to balance social welfare or
economic efficiency considerations.2 5 Finally, nothing in this Article should be
read to suggest that FPSB auctions are always value maximizing. As discussed
further below, certain conditions favor other types of auctions, including the
standard English auction. Moreover, a robust literature examines the relative
merits of auctions versus private negotiations,26 and recent scholarship suggests
that the optimal sales strategy may depend in part on the unique circumstances
of the selling firm and universe of potential buyers.2 7 The arguments presented
in this Article pertain only to transactions in which the board conducts a
structured sale that invites competitive bidding.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the theoretical
determinants of optimal auction design. Recent advances in auction theory
suggest that there is no single optimal auction structure. If certain conditions
obtain, FPSB auctions may generate higher returns for the seller than English
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 545 (4th ed. 2012) ("The questions of what Revlon duties are and when they
are triggered continue to haunt Delaware law."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography ofRevlon-Land,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3281 (2013) ("In recent years ... the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten
lost in Revlon-land. A number of chancery decisions have drifted away from the doctrinal parameters laid
down by the Delaware Supreme Court.").
24. See, e.g., Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform
Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 27, 29 (1991) (arguing that the law should bar corporate
auctions entirely because, inter alia, "[t]here is . . .no moral or distributional case for benefitting target
shareholders as a group rather than benefitting society as a whole").
25. Indeed, a target board would almost certainly breach its fiduciary duty if it proposed
a transaction at a price lower than the highest bid made because it believed the bidder's CEO was unduly
optimistic about he potential synergies between the firms.
26. See generally Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Is There One Best Way to Sell
a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28 (2009);
Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of Companies, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 30 (2001); Jeremy Bulow & Paul
Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (1996); Kenneth R. French & Robert
E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J. BUS. 417 (1984).
27. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 26, at 28 ("The main lesson ... from our research
on the M&A sales process is that one size does not fit all. Where conventional wisdom and common sense
suggest hat all sellers should implement a wide-ranging auction, our findings suggest that information
costs between sellers and buyers can severely limit the apparent benefits of an auction. And so decisions
by sellers to impose constraints on the number and kinds of bidders and otherwise 'manage' the selling
process to reduce information costs can actually create value."); accord Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4,
at 871 (conducting an empirical analysis, and finding that "that the wealth effects to targets are comparable




auctions.28 Specifically, the outcome of the auction depends on the risk
preferences of the bidders and the target, the number of potential bidders, the
distribution of those bidders' valuations for the asset at auction, and the relative
strength of the bidders who choose to participate in the structured sale. Part II
maps these theoretical insights onto target boards' decision-making processes
and illustrates that (i) several factors weighing in favor of FPSB auctions likely
exist in many circumstances germane to real-world corporate takeovers; and (ii)
structuring a value-maximizing sale is a complex matter, rife with decisions
requiring the board's business judgment. Part III turns to the current legal
landscape governing corporate auctions, and it describes recent attempts to
simulate FPSB auctions and the legal responses thereto. This Part demonstrates
that FPSB auctions, when employed by a well-informed and properly motivated
board, are consistent with the foundational policy concerns underlying Revlon
and its progeny, even though they may run afoul of Delaware courts' antipathy
towards precommitment devices. This antipathy is largely misplaced, and Part
IV develops in more detail the framework for judicial oversight of the auction
process described above. Recognizing that not all boards are properly motivated,
this Part also identifies relevant criteria by which to measure the reasonableness
of the board's actions, even given a facially neutral precommitment device.
I. Auction Theory and Optimal Mechanism Design
Auction theory is a rapidly developing branch of applied economics with a
meaningful record of successful real-world applications.29 Governmental and
regulatory bodies have applied its insights to construct complex mechanisms for
the sale of assets as varied as spectrum licenses for radio, television and cellular
coverage, carbon dioxide abatement, electrical power, timber, and U.S.
Government Treasury bills.30
Auction theory's two main goals are: (i) to model the strategic behavior of
bidders in the context of various auction structures; and (ii) based on these
findings, to predict the optimal mechanism design from the perspective of the
seller.3 1 As such, auction theory provides important guidance for sellers seeking
to maximize their gains-a matter of critical importance for a loyal corporate
28. Some commentators suggest that he optimal procedure in many cases involves a
sequential strategy that includes a FPSB auction. See Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at 1400. The merits
and limitations of the Povel & Singh mechanism are discussed further in Part IV.
29. FLAVIO M. MENEZES & PAULO K. MONTEIRO, AN INTRODUCTION TO AUCTION
THEORY 1 (2005) ("The theory of auctions is one of the most successful modem economic theories. Its
success is reflected in a coherent body of theory but also in its ability to provide insights into many
practical policy issues.").
30. PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK xii-1 (2004).
31. Ken Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Perspective on Auctions, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2073 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007). Some auction
theorists also investigate allocative efficiency. See, e.g., MILGROM, supra note 30, at 33-34; William
Samuelson, Auctions in Theory and Practice, in GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 295, 298
(Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds., 2001).
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board, which must use its business judgment to structure a sale of the company
reasonably aimed at obtaining the best deal for shareholders.
This Part begins with an overview of the game-theoretical methodology
employed to model auctions. As a threshold matter, these models require
classification of the type of good for sale into private value, common value, or
affiliated value items, terms that will be explained below. Corporations are
typically treated as private or affiliated value goods. Next, this Part describes the
four basic auction structures (English, Dutch, FPSB, and Second Price Sealed
Bid) and the associated equilibrium bidder strategies for each. This Article
focuses primarily on the distinctions between English and FPSB auctions. By
modeling bidder behavior, one can determine the seller's expected revenue for
each structure. These results depend on several features of the seller, bidders, and
bidding environment, such as risk aversion, the distribution of bidders' values
for the item at auction, the number of potential bidders, and the relative strength
of those bidders. This Part concludes with a summary of these theoretical
findings and draws conclusions about the determinants of optimal auction design
for target corporations.
Auction theory's central insight is that competitive bidding processes can
be modeled as Bayesian games, i.e., games in which players have imperfect
information.32  This modeling involves solving for the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium, which is the set of strategies that constitute each player's best
response(s) given her beliefs about other players' actions.3 3 Put plainly, a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is the situation in which each player would truthfully
answer "yes" if asked whether she was choosing the best action for herself, based
on what she thinks the other players will do.34 By deriving bidders' equilibrium
strategies, these models generate predictions about optimal auction design from
the perspective of the seller.35
32. MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 11. Technically, a Bayesian game is one
in which at least some players do not know the payoffs of the others, and are thus said to have incomplete
information. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 209 (1995). To model these games,
it is necessary to introduce a prior move by nature, which determines each player's "type" (in the context
of auctions, his valuation of the item for sale) from a probability distribution. This transforms the game
from one of incomplete information into one of imperfect information in which players are merely
uninformed about prior moves in the game. John C. Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information Played
by "Bayesian "Players, I-II. Part I. The Basic Model, 14 MGMT. SCI. 159 (1967). From there, the game
can be analyzed with standard game theory techniques.
33. MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 7 ("[E]ach player chooses a strategy
contingent on his type-that is, he uses a Bayesian decision function. We can then apply the Nash
equilibrium notion to these decision functions: each player forms a best response strategy of choosing the
best Bayesian decision functions, based on the best response strategies of other players (who are choosing
their Bayesian decision functions."); Sudipto Dasgupta & Robert G. Hansen, Auctions in Corporate
Finance, in 2 BIDDING STRATEGIES, FINANCING AND CONTROL, MODERN EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS 87
(B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2010).
34. LOuIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, DECISION ANALYSIS, GAME THEORY, AND
INFORMATION 46 (2004).




In an auction, bidders lack important information.36 In a private value
auction, each bidder knows her own subjective valuation for the object being
sold, but she is unaware of other bidders' valuations, which almost certainly
differ from her own.37 The textbook example of a private value auction is the sale
of artwork, in which bidders have idiosyncratic views of the merits of a unique
item. Making some assumptions about bidders' beliefs concerning other
bidders' valuations, we can model this uncertainty to determine equilibrium
bidder strategies.
In common value auctions, the actual value of the object being sold is the
same for all potential bidders, but bidders have varying levels of information
about that true value.39 The prototypical example is the sale of mineral rights,
where bidders have sufficiently similar costs of extraction.40 Here, too, we can
determine equilibrium bidder strategies because when a bidder reveals
information about her estimate of value (i.e., her "signal"), that revelation will
affect the remaining bidders' own estimates.4 1
In the real world, most auctions are neither purely private value nor purely
common value. These mixed auctions are typically referred to as affiliated value
auctions. Sales of companies illustrate this point. At one level, the resale value
of the target's assets or the future cash flows from those assets as currently
deployed are uncertain (in the sense that they cannot be estimated with great
precision), but the present value of those assets and cash flows is the same for all
potential acquirors at the initial stage.42 Yet, at least some acquirors also have an
element of private value resulting from idiosyncratic synergies with the target or
unique business plans moving forward. These mixed-value auctions can be
modeled as well.
It is also worth distinguishing between financial and strategic buyers.
Financial buyers are typically investment firms that acquire companies for three
possible purposes: (i) to break them up and sell off their component parts; (ii) to
hold in their portfolio and derive the benefits of the target's cash flows; or (iii)
to fix some managerial or operational defect within the target and then re-sell the
firm at a profit (or some combination of these three purposes). The economic
literature typically treats financial buyers as common value actors,43 but this is
an oversimplification. For example, while the former two categories listed above
36. If all parties had perfect information about the value of the object and about other
bidders' valuations, modeling auctions would be trivial. PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 12 (2004).
37. Id. at 13.
38. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 296-300.
39. Id.
40. JOHN H. KAGEL & DAN LEVIN, COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS AND THE WINNER'S
CURSE 2 (2002).
41. Dasgupta & Hansen, supra note 33, at 69.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at 1400 (asserting that the "situation with
financial buyers can be modeled as a common values environment").
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reflect largely common value elements of the target, the last includes an element
of private value that depends on the buyer's skill at corporate turnarounds.44
Moreover, active financial buyers may also derive synergies across their
portfolio companies.
By contrast, strategic buyers generally are operating companies that view
the target's assets as complementary to their own. For example, they might seek
an acquisition as: (i) part of a vertical integration strategy; (ii) a way of quickly
creating economies of scale; (iii) a method of increasing market share; or (iv) an
attempt to diversify their holdings. The value created as a result of those
synergies largely depends on the unique combination of assets between the target
and the acquiror and thus includes substantial elements of private value.45 For
these reasons, this Article focuses on private and affiliated value models.
The following sections build on this background to model the determinants
of a seller's optimal auction design, beginning with a description of the standard
auction mechanisms and the associated equilibrium bidder behavior.
A. A Typology ofAuctions and Equilibrium Bidder Strategies
Four basic auction types have been analyzed extensively. The most familiar
is the ascending-bid or English auction, in which the auctioneer opens the
bidding at a particular level-often the reserve price below which a seller will
not sell-and then successively raises the price until only one bidder remains.
That final bidder wins the object and must pay the value of her top bid.4 6
A descending-bid auction (also called a "Dutch" auction)47 works in
reverse: the auctioneer opens the bidding at a high price and then successively
lowers the price until one bidder accepts the object at the offered price. That
bidder wins the object at the stated price.48
In addition to these dynamic auctions, there are two standard forms of static
or "sealed bid" mechanisms. In the FPSB auction described briefly in the
Introduction, each bidder independently submits a single bid without seeing any
of the other bidders' bids.4 9 The highest bidder wins the object at the price that
44. B. Espen Eckbo, Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review, 15 J. CORP.
FIN. 149, 166 (2009) ("Since bidders tend to have different skill levels in terms of managing the target
assets, it is often assumed that the valuations ... are uncorrelated across bidders-a private value.").
45. Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at 1400 ("[T]rade buyers may be interested in a target
because of possible synergies that are not available to other bidders; this situation can be modeled as a
private values environment.").
46. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 11.
47. This terminology is slightly confusing since many investment bankers use the term
"Dutch Auction" to refer to the second-price sealed bid auction. See id. at 11 n.10.





she bid.5 o Second-price sealed bid ("SPSB") auctions follow the same structure,
but the winning bidder pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.51
Given these auction structures, how should a rational bidder bid? With
private values, the English and SPSB auctions have the clearest dominant
strategy: truth telling.52 In an ascending auction, the dominant strategy is to
remain in the bidding until the price reaches your own estimate of value; this
strategy performs at least as well as any other, regardless of what the other
players do.53 If the second-highest bidder drops out of the bidding before you,
you will win the auction and pay that bidder's price (plus any minimum bidding
increment). If the bidding continues past your true value, you cannot improve
your position by making additional bids since they will only result in a net loss
if you win the auction.
A similar dominant strategy obtains in the SPSB auction. Assume your true
value is v, the highest bid other than yours is a, and your actual bid is x. If you
bid less than your true value (v - x), but your discounted bid remains higher than
a, then you win the auction and pay a for the object-the same amount you would
have paid if you bid v. If a > v (i.e., there is a bid higher than your valuation),
then you lose the auction regardless of whether you bid your true value or less.
However, if v > a > v - x, then you will have lost an auction that you otherwise
could have won. Thus, you do not gain by bidding less than your true value, and
you may well lose out on winning the auction and obtaining the surplus v - a.
Similarly, bidding more than your true value (v + x) fares no better. If v >
a, then you win in either event and still pay only a, i.e., the same amount as if
you had bid your true value. If a > v + x, then you lose regardless of your bid. If,
however, v + x > a > v, then you will "win" the auction but with a net loss of a -
v. Thus, bidding higher than your true value can hurt you, but it can never help
you. Given these two results, it is optimal to bid your true valuation, regardless
of what the other players do.54
Thus, in private value auctions, the English auction is strategically
equivalent to the SPSB auction.55 If there are elements of common value, this
equivalence may not fully hold because bidders will update their own beliefs
about the true value of the object if they can observe other bidders dropping out
(which they can do in an English auction but not in a SPSB structure)."
50. Id.
51. Id. SPSB auctions are also termed Vickrey auctions, in recognition of William
Vickrey's foundational paper on auction theory. See also William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions,
and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961).
52. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 13-14; Dasgupta & Hansen, supra note 33, at 61.
53. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 301.
54. For a similar derivation, see KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 14 n.20.
55. See MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 20.
56. See KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 14.
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However, even in common value auctions, the equivalence remains if there are
only two bidders.5 This is, in fact, the norm in corporate takeovers.
The Dutch and FPSB auctions are also strategically equivalent, though
equilibrium behavior is more complicated to model.59 Here, truth telling is no
longer a dominant strategy. Because the winning bidder pays her bid price,
bidders will not bid an amount equal to their private value as this would
guarantee a payoff of zero if theirs was the winning bid.60 Instead, the optimal
strategy is a function of both the probability of winning the auction (which
increases with the amount bid) and the payoff (which decreases with the amount
bid). 6 1 Bidders' equilibrium strategy is thus to assume they have the highest
private value and to shade their bid lower-but by how much?
The amount of shading depends on a bidder's beliefs about the distribution
of other bidders' private values and specifically on her view of the probability
that she will win the auction given any particular bid.62 More formally, bidders
in a FPSB auction attempt to maximize their own expected utility (ui) given their
private valuation of the object (vi), the likelihood of their winning the auction
(Pr(win)), and the price they must pay if they win. In a FPSB auction, the winner
pays her bid price, so price = bi. Thus, ui= Pr(win) * (vi - bi). If private values
are independently distributed along an interval [0,1] and there are two
symmetrical bidders,6 3 player i's equilibrium bid function is bi (vi) = (1/2) * vi.
Extending the bid function to an auction with N players, player i's equilibrium
bid function is bi (vi) = (N-i/N) * vi. 64 In other words, player i's bid shading
decreases as the number of bidders increases.65
B. Revenue Equivalence Theorem and Its Assumptions
Given these equilibrium bidding strategies, one can draw some preliminary
and rather startling conclusions about the relative expected revenue generated for
each of the auction structures described above. Assuming each bidder is risk-
57. Id.
58. See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4, at 852 (finding that there were, on average,
1.57 private bidders and 1.24 public bidders in the auctions in their sample).
59. See VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 16-20 (2002); MENEZES & MONTEIRO,
supra note 29, at 17; Samuelson, supra note 31, at 300.
60. KRISHNA, supra note 59, at 16.
61. MILGROM, supra note 30, at 113.
62. The intuition concerning the Dutch, descending auction is as follows: before each
incremental decrease in bid, the bidder asks herself whether the bid price is at or below her private value.
If so, she makes a determination of the likelihood that the next step down is, in fact, the next-highest
bidders' likely bid. For a mathematical proof of the above description, see KRISHNA, supra note 59, at 16-
20; and MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 17. This Article does not analyze in any detail the use
of Dutch auctions in the sale of companies.
63. In this context, symmetrical denotes that all players believe their values are drawn
from the same distribution.
64. For derivations, see Samuelson, supra note 31, at 302-03; and KRISHNA, supra note
59, at 16-20.




neutral and has a private value independently drawn from the same probability
distribution as all of the other bidders',66 all four standard auctions will generate
the same expected revenue for the seller.67 This result is described as the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem,6 8 and the assumptions on which it rests are termed the
benchmark model.
If revenue equivalence held strongly in the real world, then auction design
would be more or less irrelevant. However, the benchmark model does not
necessarily approximate real-world bidder behavior. The empirical research
related to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is voluminous.69 However, broadly
speaking, actual bidding behavior tends to approximate the equilibrium
predictions for English and SPSB auctions but does not track as well the
equilibrium prediction for the FPSB auction.7 0 Specifically, in many cases, FPSB
auctions generate greater than expected revenue for the seller.71 In other cases,
English auctions are preferable. Determining why and when is of substantial
importance for a seller attempting to structure a sale that maximizes her revenue.
This Section surveys the impact of relaxing several key assumptions from the
benchmark model.
1. Risk-Averse Buyers
The benchmark case assumes that buyers are risk-neutral.72 That is, they
seek to maximize their expected profits without regard to variance (i.e., risk). To
illustrate with a simple example, a risk-neutral actor would be ambivalent
between a guaranteed payment of $50 and a coin-flip in which he receives $100
if the coin lands heads and $0 if the coin lands tails. Each option has the same
expected value ($50). A risk-averse actor, by contrast, prefers the more certain
outcome. Accordingly, a risk-averse actor would always opt for the guaranteed
$50 rather than the more variable opportunity to win $100. In other words, risk-
averse actors must be compensated for the variance to which they are subjected.
In the example above, a risk-averse actor might even opt for a sum-certain of less
than $50 (say, $45) rather than a 50% chance of winning $100.
66. The benchmark model also takes for granted a fixed number of auction participants
(N > 1). See KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 131.
67. For the foundational findings, see Vickrey, supra note 51; Roger B. Myerson,
Optimal Auction Design, 6 MATHEMATICS OPERATIONS RES. 58 (1981); and John G. Riley & William F.
Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 381 (1981).
68. See, e.g., KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 16-19.
69. Though, as Samuelson notes, much of this empirical work derives from controlled
auction experiments. See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 302.
70. Id. at 305 ("Given symmetric independent private values, actual bidding behavior
approximates the equilibrium prediction for the [SPSB] auction and exceeds the risk-neutral equilibrium
prediction for the [FPSB] auction. The [FPSB] auction generates greater expected revenue with an
accompanying modest reduction in efficiency.").
71. Id. Samuelson notes that this increase in revenue may come at the expense of
allocative efficiency. Id.
72. KRISHNA, supra note 59, at 37.
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If bidders are risk-averse (but all other assumptions are held constant), the
revenue equivalence principle no longer holds; FPSB auctions are likely to
generate greater expected revenues than English auctions.7 Risk-averse actors
seek to maximize their utility rather than their expected profits.74 For risk-averse
bidders, the effect of a slightly lower surplus (by virtue of having won the auction
by making a higher bid) has smaller utility consequences than does the possibility
that making a lower bid causes them to lose an auction that they could have won
if only they had bid more.75 Thus, risk-averse bidders will bid higher than the
equilibrium strategy predicts if it increases their odds of winning the auction,
even though it may yield a smaller surplus.76
Accordingly, risk aversion does not impact strategies in an English auction.
The dominant strategy-even for risk averse bidders-remains to bid up to one's
true valuation.77 Bidding higher than that can only lead to winning the auction
but suffering a loss in the process.
On the other hand, in a FPSB auction, risk-averse bidders will bid more
aggressively, i.e., shade their bids less than the equilibrium strategy predicts
(though they will still bid less than their true valuation), thus increasing their
probability of winning the auction at the cost of a reduced surplus from having
won the auction.78 More aggressive bidding in the FPSB auction leads to higher
average bids, which in turn generates greater expected revenue for the seller.
The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent of the winning bidder's
risk aversion. Samuelson reports that in experimental settings "subjects place
average bids that are significantly above the risk-neutral equilibrium
prediction . . . ."7 This gap is most pronounced with only two bidders and
gradually decreases as the number of bidders increases.80 Accordingly,
Samuelson suggests that a seller auctioning an item to risk-averse bidders may
be best served by conducting an English auction to narrow the field down to two
final-round bidders and employing a final-round FPSB auction to determine the
winner between the remaining two.8 1
73. Id. at 38-42. Krishna demonstrates that this result obtains regardless of whether one
employs a constant relative risk aversion or constant absolute risk aversion utility function. Id. at 40-42.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id.
76. Id. Krishna analogizes this behavior to buying insurance against the possibility of
losing the auction. Id.
77. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 19. If there are common-value components,
participants likely alter this strategy slightly to accommodate the auction rules regarding tie-breaking. Id.
at 19 n.37.
78. Id. at 19; MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 34.
79. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 302.
80. Id. at 302-03.





The benchmark model also assumes that sellers are risk-neutral. Assuming
revenue equivalence holds, risk-neutral sellers should be ambivalent between the
various auctions, which all generate the same expected revenues. A risk-averse
seller, however, will select the auction structure with the least variance in
outcomes. This behavior is analogous to the coin-flip example described above:
if all else is equal, a risk-averse seller must be compensated for increased
variability.
FPSB auctions are less variable than English and SPSB auctions.82 In a
SPSB auction, the winner pays a price that is set by the second-highest bidder.8
By revenue equivalence, the winner of a FPSB auction will bid the expectation
of that price.84 Thus, in a FPSB auction, the seller's revenue is fixed-it depends
only on the high bidder's bid. In an English or SPSB auction, however, revenue
is variable (depending on the private value of the second-highest bidder) along a
distribution with the same mean.85 Thus, all else being equal, a risk-averse seller
should prefer FPSB auctions to English and SPSB auctions.86
3. Affiliated Values
The benchmark model assumes that private values are independently drawn
from the same distribution. In other words, none of the bidders' private values
depends on any of the other bidders' valuations. This is, obviously, an artificial
assumption in the context of corporate takeovers, since acquirors' estimates of
value will include both idiosyncratic private value attributable to their unique
plans for the target as well as elements of common value arising from the target's
cash flows and assets.87 In other words, the bidders' values are affiliated, not
independent. In this context, affiliation means that if one bidder's signal (i.e., her
estimation of value) is high, it is more likely that other bidders' signals are high
as well.
If the bidders' signals are affiliated, but all other assumptions of the
benchmark model hold, English auctions will generate more expected revenues
82. For a mathematical proof, see Keith Waehrer et al., Auction Form Preferences of
Risk-Averse Bid Takers, 29 RAND J. EcON. 179, 181-85 (1998).
83. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id.; Waehrer et al., supra note 82, at 180 ("[C]onditioned on the highest signal,
revenue in a [FPSB auction] is nonstochastic; under the same conditioning, revenue in other auctions
retains its randomness.").
86. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 19. In cases where private values are independently
distributed, risk-averse sellers should also prefer SPSB auctions to standard English auctions. Id.
87. See MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 57 (describing affiliated values as
incorporating both private-value and common-value components); Samuelson, supra note 31, at 305
(same).
88. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 48. Affiliated signals differ from merely correlated
signals in that they satisfy this condition on every subspace of the variables' domain. Id.
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than SPSB auctions, which in turn will generate more expected revenues than
FPSB auctions.89 This result obtains largely because of the "winner's curse"
phenomenon in common-value auctions.90 Recall that in a pure common-value
auction the object for sale has identical value for all bidders, but each bidder has
imperfect information about that true value. Accordingly, the winner of the
auction will always be the bidder with the most optimistic estimate of that value.
By definition, the bidder with the most optimistic estimate is also the most likely
to have overvalued the object for sale-thus, the winner's curse.
In a FPSB auction, bidders are not only unaware of the item's true value;
they are also unaware of how their estimate compares with those of other bidders.
Thus, they must discount their estimates before making a bid. If all participants
in the auction follow this pattern, the sale will generate less revenue.91 The same
dynamic applies to SPSB auctions, but here the participants will rationally
discount their values slightly less since the winner need only pay the second-
highest bidder's price. In an open English auction with more than two
participants, however, bidders obtain valuable information by watching other
parties bid and/or drop out. They can then gauge whether their initial estimate
was overly optimistic and are thus more likely to bid closer to the true value of
the object for sale.92 The same basic rationale applies when bidders have
affiliated values with a meaningful common-value component; bidders will
discount their estimates more in auctions that provide them with less information
about the optimism of their signal.93 Thus, all else being equal, English auctions
are expected to generate at least as much revenue as SPSB auctions and more
revenue than FPSB auctions when values are affiliated.
Several commentators, however, question the magnitude of this revenue
advantage from both modeling and empirical perspectives. Li and Riley find that,
in a two-bidder auction (the case most likely to exhibit a pronounced effect and
also the most likely in a corporate takeover context),94 the expected revenue
advantage of the English auction is only one quarter of one standard deviation,
even for very highly correlated values (p=0.7).95 Similarly, Klemperer notes,
"numerical analysis suggests the effects of affiliation are often tiny, even when
bidders who exactly fit the assumptions of the theory compute their bids exactly
89. KRISHNA, supra note 59, at 96.
90. KAGEL & LEVIN, supra note 40, at 1-4 (describing the winner's curse phenomenon).
91. Klemperer suggests that the mathematical results are better explained by types of
private information revealed via the various auction processes. See KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 127-
28.
92. This holds true only if the auction structure allows bidders to observe this
information. If not, then a given bidder can only ascertain that at least one other bidder remains, and the
bidders' strategies converge towards a SPSB auction.
93. For a different explanation of this phenomenon, see KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at
48-50.
94. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4, at 852 (reporting that corporate sellers receive,
on average, fewer than two public bids).




using the theory."96 Samuelson reports everal laboratory and field studies that
find pervasive evidence of the winner's curse, suggesting that bidders do not
discount their values as much as the equilibrium model predicts.9 7 Menzes and
Monteiro demonstrate that the effects of risk-aversion given risk-averse buyers
(discussed above) reduce, and may overtake, the affiliation effect.98 Finally,
Krishna shows that sellers can increase expected revenues in affiliated FPSB
auctions by releasing private information concerning the common-value
elements of the object for sale.99 Ultimately, Klemperer concludes that "there is
no empirical evidence ... that argues the affiliation effect is important."'00
4. Asymmetrical Valuation Distributions
Finally, the benchmark model assumes that bidders' values are symmetric,
in the sense that they are drawn from the same distribution. But there may exist
categorically "strong" and "weak" bidders, whose valuations are drawn from
different distributions altogether.'0 If so, this too may favor FPSB auctions.102
In a SPSB or English two-bidder auction, the weak bidder's value determines the
price a strong bidder must pay. If the weak bidder's value is sufficiently low, the
winning bidder may win the auction for less than her equilibrium strategy bid in
a FPSB auction.'o3
In a FPSB auction, when a bidder is recognized as stronger, competing
bidders will likely bid more aggressively (i.e., closer to their own value) in the
hopes that he strong bidder overplays her hand by shading her bid too far. 104 A
rational, sophisticated strong bidder may compensate for this increased
competition by shading her bid less than she would have otherwise. Both of these
possibilities generate higher expected revenues for the seller. However, this
dynamic is absent entirely from an English auction since a stronger bidder need
96. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 129.
97. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 307-11. Empirical evidence on the magnitude of the
winner's curse in corporate takeovers is mixed. Many commentators conclude that the winner's curse
holds in the corporate takeover market. See, e.g., Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE 145 (B. Espen Eckbo, ed., 2007); Nicholas Barberis & Richard
Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICs OF FINANCE 1053 (George
M. Constantinides et al., eds., 2003); Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
191 (1988). A recent study disputes those findings. See Audra L. Boone & Harold Mulherin, Do Auctions
Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 18
(2008) (arguing that the empirical evidence "do[es] not support the presence of a winner's curse in the
corporate takeover market").
98. MENEZES & MONTEIRO, supra note 29, at 73. But see Li & Riley, supra note 95, at
1269 (suggesting that-at least in their model-the effects of risk aversion were small as well).
99. KRISHNA, supra note 59, at 106-07.
100. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 130.
101. Part II.B provides examples of strong and weak bidders in the corporate takeover
context.
102. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 129 (concluding that asymmetry can easily
overtake the effects of affiliation).
103. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 312.
104. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 22.
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only wait until the weaker bidder exits the auction at approximately her true
lower value. Thus, in some cases, FPSB auctions will generate greater additional
revenue than will English auctions.1os Here, the wealth effect depends on the
shapes of the bidders' value distributions. Klemperer explains that FPSB
auctions are expected to generate more revenue where the distributions have
similar shapes but different supports, i.e., upper and lower bounds. Conversely,
English auctions are preferable where the distributions have different shapes but
the same supports.106
. Numerical analysis demonstrates that the wealth effect of asymmetric value
distributions is particularly salient where there is a single strong bidder.o10 Where
there are two or more strong bidders, however, revenue differences between the
auction types are inconsequential.08
This result has a critical implication for an aspect of the auction process
overlooked entirely in the benchmark model: the number of bidders who actually
participate in the process.09 The expected profitability of an auction depends
critically on the number of bidders."0 Indeed, Bulow and Klemperer demonstrate
that a simple ascending auction with N+1 bidders is more profitable than any
type of auction that can be run with N bidders.'' Recall, for example that, in
equilibrium, bid-shading in a FPSB auction is inversely proportional to the
number of participants. Without at least two bidders, there is no auction at all.
In English auctions, the bidder with the highest valuation always wins.
Thus, weaker bidders may simply not participate if the costs of entry are too
high.112 In real-world FPSB auctions, however, a strong bidder might submit a
lowball bid, and a weaker bidder that is willing to bid aggressively may prevail.
This is especially true if the strong bidder is less risk-averse than the weaker
bidders. Thus, given asymmetric bidders, a FPSB auction is more likely to attract
multiple bidders than an English auction.113
Recently, Povel and Singh have suggested that bidder asymmetries can be
exploited even further in the context of corporate takeovers to form an "optimal"
105. MILGROM, supra note 30, at 151.
106. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 22 ("[R]oughly speaking, [the FPSB] auction
generates more revenue than the [SPSB] auction when bidders have distributions with the same shape (but
different supports), whereas the open auction dominates when, across bidders, distributions have different
shapes but approximately the same support.").
107. Li & Riley, supra note 95, at 1288; Eric Maskin & John Riley, Asymmetric
Auctions, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 413, 416 (2000).
108. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 313.
109. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 131 (noting that the benchmark model takes as
given N bidders, where N>1).
110. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 296.
111. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 26, at 180.
112. Griffith makes a similar point, employing an extensive-form game theoretical
analysis. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 605-13.
113. Maskin & Riley, supra note 107 (finding that strong buyers prefer second-price




sequential sales structure.'14 They suggest hat targets should identify a strong
bidder (in this case, defined as better-informed about the true value of the target
corporation) and a weak bidder. The target then communicates exclusively with
the strong bidder and informs her that she can buy the company if her price is
sufficiently high. If so, the deal will be concluded without any competition. If
not, she has the option to participate in a FPSB auction with the weaker bidder,
but only if she is willing to bid a certain reserve amount. If she is unwilling to do
either, the target will offer the company to the weak bidder at a price that the
weak bidder is unlikely to reject. Povel and Singh argue that treating
asymmetrical bidders differently by offering the strong bidder the carrot of
certainty accompanied by the stick of losing the target to a weaker bidder if she
tries to lowball generates the highest expected outcomes for the target."'5
5. Optimal Mechanism Design: A Summary
Relaxing the assumptions of the benchmark model illustrates that the choice
of structure may matter a lot to a seller designing a value-maximizing auction.
Table 1 summarizes these determinants of optimal auction design.
Table 1: The Determinants of Optimal Auction Structure: Departures From the
Benchmark Model






Asymmetrical Bidders (if X
distributions have similar
shape, but different supports)
Asymmetrical Bidders (if X
distributions have different
shapes, but same supports)
Single Strong Bidder vs. X
Weaker Bidders
Multiple Strong Bidders N/A N/A
Ultimately, standard English auctions may generate the highest expected
revenues (or at least revenues that are not substantially dissimilar from other
structures) in some cases. If certain conditions obtain, such as risk-aversion
among the participants or certain asymmetrical value distributions among the
114. Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at 1400-01. The remainder of this paragraph
describing their proposed structure is drawn from the same source.
115. In Part IV, Povel and Singh's proposal is re-examined in light of the judicial
review framework proposed in that Part.
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bidders, the seller should prefer a FPSB structure. Additionally, in the presence
of a single strong bidder, employing a FPSB structure may draw weaker bidders
into the process when such bidders would have otherwise refused to participate
in an English auction (which would have allowed the strong bidder to maximize
her own surplus at the expense of the target). The following Part maps these
theoretical insights onto a target board's real-world decision-making process.
II. Structuring Corporate Auctions in the Real World: Empirical Evidence from
the Takeover Market
Part I demonstrated that choosing an optimal auction mechanism requires
an analysis of highly transaction-specific variables. In other words, this process
involves substantial business judgment. This Part examines some of the factors
that a loyal board might properly consider when deciding how to structure a
value-maximizing sale of the company. The inquiry surveys when a target board,
operating under real-world conditions, might reasonably conclude that a FPSB
structure is more favorable than an English auction."6
A. Risk Aversion in Corporate Takeovers
A foundational principle of behavioral economics is that most people are
risk averse concerning potential gains."7 However, while risk aversion is the
super-majority position, there is nevertheless substantial heterogeneity in risk
tolerances across the population."8 As a class, American CEOs are "much more
risk-tolerant than the lay population of similar age profile.""1 9 They are also more
risk-tolerant than non-American CEOs.120 Further, risk-tolerant CEOs are also
more likely to make acquisitions.121 Yet, even among American CEOs, there
remains a wide variety of risk tolerances. Indeed, it is reported that nearly 10%
116. As noted in the Introduction, a board might also legitimately conclude, under the
circumstances, that the best path forward involves private negotiations with one or more parties.
117. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 454 (1981) ("[T]he majority choice ... is risk averse: a riskless
prospect is preferred to a risky prospect of equal or greater expected value."). Tversky and Kahneman also
report that the majority is risk-seeking with respect to losses. Id.
118. Robert B. Barsky et al., Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity:
An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study, 112 Q.J. ECON. 537, 545 (1997) (noting
that the response exhibiting the least risk tolerance is strongly modal but that there is nevertheless
substantial heterogeneity in risk tolerances).
119. John R. Graham et al., Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions 22 (May 22,
2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-1432641. The risk tolerances of CEOs may be more important in this
context than those of board members, given that CEOs self-report that they are the dominant decision-
makers in buy-side mergers and acquisitions. See John R. Graham et al., Capital Allocation and
Delegation of Decision-Making Authority Within Firms 15 (June 27, 2014),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1571527 (finding that nearly 50% of U.S. CEOs claim to make these decisions
in near isolation).
120. Graham et al., Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions, supra note 119, at
17.




of CEOs surveyed were classified as displaying low risk tolerance.1 22 Several
studies, for example, report that CEOs' risk aversion may account for their desire
to acquire firms outside of their core industries as a way of diversifying their own
personal wealth.123 Thus, at the very least, there is no a priori reason to assume
that acquirors in the M&A market are uniformly risk-neutral, or to rely on broad
generalizations or heuristics concerning the degree of acquirors' risk-aversion.
To the contrary, the target board (along with its financial and legal advisors)
should carefully investigate the risk profiles of potential acquirors to determine
whether a FPSB auction might encourage bidders to bid closer to their true
values.
The standard model may also underestimate the effects of risk-aversion
because it assumes that losing bidders have payoffs of zero. In reality, however,
bidders can suffer tangible loss if they fail to acquire a target. For example, when
strategic bidders compete for a target within their industry, the loser may suffer
harms as a result of the winner's increased market share or newfound economies
of scale. More generally, there are search, diligence, and legal costs associated
with making a bid.
In these cases, another tenet of behavioral economics-loss aversion-may
amplify the bidders' risk-averse behavior. As Kahneman and his co-authors
explain:
[A] central conclusion of the study of risky choice has been that such choices are
best explained by assuming that the significant carriers of utility are not states of
wealth or welfare, but changes relative to a neutral reference point. Another
central result is that changes that make things worse (losses) loom larger than
improvements or gains.124
Thus, the threat of losing the auction may spur at least some bidders to increase
their bids since the cost of paying slightly more for the target weighs much less
heavily than the potential loss associated with a competitor winning the auction.
A recent real-world example illustrates these theoretical insights. In May
and June 2014, Hillshire Brands Co. received several unsolicited takeover bids
from industry rivals Tyson Foods, Inc. and Pilgrim's Pride Corp,125 Tyson
offered to purchase Hillshire for $50/share (approximately $6.2 billion);
122. Graham et al., Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions, supra note 119, at
15.
123. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive
for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 605-17 (1981) (finding suggestive evidence that risk
aversion causes managers to acquire firms outside their core industries as a method of diversifying their
personal wealth); Bart Frijns et al., Cultural Values, CEO Risk Aversion and Corporate Takeovers 4 (Oct.
12, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract=1942971.
124. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199 (1991).
125. Dana Mattioli, Tyson Wins Bid Against Itself WALL ST. J., June 9, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/tyson-foods-ncaring-deal-for-hillshire-brands-1402314461.
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Pilgrim's Pride offered $55/share (approximately $6.7 billion). 12 6 After
consulting its investment bankers, Hillshire decided to conduct a modified FPSB
auction between its suitors. Each company would simultaneously submit a bid
on a particular day and time, without knowing the status of the other company's
bid.127 If the bids were less than $2.50/share apart, each bidder would have the
opportunity to submit a second bid.1 2 8 However, if either bid topped the other by
$2.50/share or more, the auction would end and the company would pursue a
transaction with the winning bidder.129 In the first round of sealed bidding, Tyson
raised its offer to $63/share, approximately $7.7 billion. 30 Pilgrim's Pride,
however, did not raise its bid at all.131 Tyson and Hillshire thereafter entered into
a definitive merger agreement at $63/share,32 and the merger closed on August
28, 2014.13
Hillshire's decision to employ a sealed bid process rather than an English
auction appears to have secured several hundred million dollars of additional
value for its shareholders. In an English auction, Tyson would have learned that
Pilgrim's Pride had dropped out at $55/share. Assuming a minimum bid
increment of $2.50/share, Tyson could have won the bidding for $57.50/share.
Why did Tyson increase its bid by such a large margin? It is impossible to know
for certain, but the relationship between the bidders and a statement made by
Donnie Smith, Tyson's CEO, hint at Tyson's risk aversion concerning the
outcome of the auction. Tyson and Pilgrim's Pride (or, more precisely, the
latter's parent company) are chief rivals in their industry, and according to
industry commentators, Tyson's acquisition of Hillshire was a strategic move
meant to "contain" its rival's expansion.134 Moreover, shortly after the results of
the auction were made public, Mr. Smith commented that the purchase price was
justified because "[b]rands like Hillshire . . . don't become available very
often."'35 The combination of these factors suggests that, given the sealed-bid
structure, Tyson made a strategic decision to trade some of the surplus from the
deal for a substantially higher likelihood of winning the auction.
126. Jeffrey McCracken & David Welch, Tyson Said to Win Hillshire Bidding, Beating
Pilgrim s Pride, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 9, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-08/tyson-
said-to-win-bidding-for-hillshire-beating-pilgrim-s-pride.html. Pilgrim's Pride had made an earlier,
tentative offer of $45 per share. Mattioli, supra note 125.





132. Press Release, Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Foods and Hillshire Brands Announce
Definitive Merger Agreement (July 2, 2014), http://ir.tyson.com/investor-relations/news-releases/news-
releases-details/2014/Tyson-Foods-and-Hillshire-Brands-Announce-Definitive-Merger-Agreement/
default.aspx.
133. Press Release, Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Foods Hillshire Brands Complete Merger
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.tysonfoods.com/Media/News-Releases/2014/08/Merger-Complete.aspx. As
of this writing, no party has challenged the legality of either the auction process or the merger itself.





Sellers, too, might be risk-averse. It's unclear why a target board (or a
corporation's shareholders) would prefer the more variable outcomes associated
with English auctions unless there is a commensurate increase in expected value.
Thus, all else equal, FPSB auctions are preferable even if the other assumptions
of the baseline model hold. If, however, other factors weigh in favor of an
English auction, the board must carefully balance the variability of outcomes
against the higher expected value. Rational diversified shareholders should
prefer that the board maximize the risk-adjusted returns of any investment,
including the sale of the corporation.13 6
B. Asymmetric Bidders and Their Incentives to Bid
There is ample reason to believe that strong and weak bidders exist in many
competitive bidding situations, i.e., bidders' values are often asymmetric. For
example, a management-led buyout team is clearly in a strong position given its
informational advantage over outside bidders.137 Similarly, strategic buyers who
see substantial private values resulting from synergies with the target may be in
a stronger position than financial buyers, whose value is largely drawn from
common value attributable to the target's current enterprise. A recent study
supports this intuition, finding that strategic bidders have higher average
valuations across all targets.138 However, a more granular examination of the
data illustrates that financial buyers may be stronger than strategic buyers in
some circumstances. For example, Gorbenko and Malenko find that financial
buyers are willing to offer higher bids for poorly performing target companies.139
Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf and Harford suggest that this result obtains because
financial buyers are repeat players in the takeover markets and thus are more
experienced at monitoring underperforming companies and better able, due to
their ability to diversify capital structures across their deals, to take advantage of
factors such as putatively overpriced debt.140
If putatively weak bidders have reputations for bidding aggressively or if
putatively strong bidders have reputations for hard-nosed negotiations in which
136. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983) ("In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the
best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.");
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Shareholders don't want (or
shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders' investment interests, across the full
range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers
honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available
that are above the firm's cost of capital.").
137. Conducting a FPSB auction in this context may also insulate the board from
allegations of conflict or favoritism.
138. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bidders in
Takeover Auctions, 69 J. FIN. 2513 (2014).
139. Id.
140. Marc Martos-Vila et al., Financial vs. Strategic Buyers (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 12-098, 2014), http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/Publication%20Files/12-098_dc44025a-785b-
45c5-9d31-60e02f091b7d.pdf.
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they lowball targets, a FPSB auction may generate meaningfully increased
returns. Thus, the board ought to inform itself about the strength and reputation
of the potential acquirors.
Relatedly, and perhaps most importantly, the target board should carefully
consider whether it needs to entice entrants into the process. As described above,
increasing the number of bidders generally increases the seller's expected
revenue, and adding a second bidder to the mix-without whom there can be no
auction at all-is critical. This dynamic is especially important in the corporate
takeover context. Boone and Mulherin report that, on average, targets receive
fewer than two private offers when they engage in a competitive bidding
process.141 Thus, in many transactions there is ultimately only one bidder and a
real risk that the target will be unable to extract much surplus from the auction.
A famous case illustrates this point. In 1995, Glaxo bid £9 billion for Wellcome,
a drug company, in an ascending auction.142 While both Zeneca and Roche
expressed some willingness to make higher bids, they ultimately elected not to
enter the process when it became clear that Glaxo was a stronger bidder and thus
would likely top any bid.143 Wellcome's CEO later admitted that "there was
money left on the table." 44
FPSB auctions entice weaker entrants precisely because the winning bidder
is less easily identifiable ex ante. As Klemperer describes, in an English auction,
the strong bidder will simply top any bid made by the weaker bidder(s). 145 Given
that participating in corporate takeover auctions is costly-for example, the
bidders must hire financial and legal advisors and incur due diligence costs-
weaker bidders will rationally refuse to participate if they fear they have no
realistic chance of winning.146 However, in a FPSB structure, an aggressive weak
bidder might win the auction at a price the strong bidder could have beaten but
failed to beat because it attempted to maximize its surplus by submitting a
lowball offer.1 47 Moreover, even if weaker bidders do not ultimately win the
auction, they force the stronger bidder into a bidding strategy more favorable to
the target. As discussed above, this effect is strongest where there is a single
strong bidder.14 8
141. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4, at 852.
142. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 106.
143. Id. at 106-08.
144. Id. at 106.
145. Id. at 132.
146. Id.; see also Griffith, supra note 14, at 605-13.
147. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 132.
148. More speculatively, weak financial buyers might enter the bidding process as
arbitrageurs. For example, if a strong strategic buyer miscalculates and loses a takeover bid, it may be
willing to purchase the target in a resale transaction if the winning bid from the primary auction was
sufficiently below its private value. Thus, target boards may wish to employ FPSB auctions in cases where





In sum, there are plausible real-world situations in which conducting a
FPSB auction leads to higher expected revenues for the target. A necessary
requirement of a FPSB auction is that the seller credibly precommit to the rules
of the game. If bidders believe that they can bid outside of the process,
opportunistic acquirors will change their strategies and act as if the process was
in fact an English (or SPSB) auction.149 Yet, as described in the following Part,
the legality of such precommitment devices is uncertain under Delaware law.
III. The Fiduciary Obligations of a Selling Board
A. Revlon's Auctioneers
In the ordinary course of business, corporate boards are granted broad
deference by the courts under the business judgment rule, which presumes that
the board is well-informed, independent, and acting in the best interests of the
firm. In the absence of fraud, illegality, or conflicts of interest, board decisions
are not subject to judicial second-guessing.5 0 Irrationality is the only substantive
boundary.15 1 The practical consequence of this deference is that while directors
as corporate fiduciaries are charged with acting in the best interests of the firm,
they are afforded broad latitude to pursue that end by the means they deem
appropriate.
Matters stand differently, however, when a corporation is put-up for sale in
a change of control transaction. First, the board now has a singular, judicially
defined goal: it must secure the best value reasonably attainable for the
stockholders.152 Unpacking this statement reveals two related board obligations.
All else equal,153 the board must accept the highest price offered.154 As such, the
149. See, e.g., KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 11; Povel & Singh, supra note 3, at
1415.
150. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[l]n the
absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally
responsible to the corporation for losses that may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made
or that directors authorized in good faith.").
151. Id. at 1052-53 ("[Wlhere a director is independent and disinterested, there can be
no liability for corporate loss, unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize such a
transaction if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their duty."); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *1169 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) ("As I
conceptualize the matter, such limited substantive review as the rule contemplates (i.e., is the judgment
under review 'egregious' or 'irrational' or 'so beyond reason,' etc.) really is a way of inferring bad faith.").
152. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,44 (Del.
1994) ("In the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective-to secure the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders-and they must exercise their
fiduciary duties to further that end.").
153. Of course, all else is not always equal. For example, the board may be required to
consider the present value of different types of consideration, legal impediments to particular transactions
or to transactions with particular acquirors, and any uncertainty over the acquiror's ability to obtain
financing or otherwise close the transaction. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (listing factors a board can
properly consider, such as the risk of non-consummation and questions of illegality); In re RJR Nabisco,
1989 WL 703614, at *1161 (Del. Ch. 1989) (discussing board valuation of non-cash consideration).
154. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
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board can neither consider the interests of other stakeholders (such as employees
or creditors) insofar as they diverge from those of stockholders'5 5 nor justify
accepting a financially inferior proposal on the basis that it is somehow in the
long-term best interests of the firm.156 More importantly for the purposes of this
Article, the board cannot remain passive and watch the sales process unfold
organically; it must actively structure a process intended to elicit the best price.5 7
Boards fulfill this obligation by either holding an auction or negotiating a private
transaction in conjunction with a thorough market check to ensure that there is
no better deal available.58
Second, Revlon imposes a more exacting standard ofjudicial review.15 9 The
board's decisions are no longer protected by the business judgment rule. Instead,
the court will review the reasonableness of the board's decision-making process
and the resulting substance of its sales structure.16 0  In this context,
reasonableness requires that the board inform itself about the prevailing
circumstances and then conduct a sales process aimed at maximizing value in
light of that information.'6' That said, Delaware jurisprudence emphasizes that
the board retains substantial discretion concerning its preferred sales structure.
As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, "[n]o court can tell directors
exactly how to accomplish that goal, because they will be facing a unique
combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their control." 62
Accordingly, "there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its
155. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided
there are rationally related benefits accruing to stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder
interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is
to protect or maintain the corporate nterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.") (internal citation
omitted).
156. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (noting that when Revlon is triggered, "an asset belonging
to public stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be available again").
157. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (holding
that "directors must engage actively in the sale process") (internal quotation omitted); QVC, 637 A.2d at
46 (holding that, when Revlon applies, the board is "required to pursue a transaction that is calculated to
produce the best value reasonably available to the stockholders"); Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989) (discussing "a board's active and direct role in the sale
process"); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 n.16 ("[W]e do not embrace the 'passivity' thesis rejected in
Unocal .... The directors' role remains an active one, changed only in the respect that they are charged
with the duty of selling the company at the highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit.") (internal
citation omitted); In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Revlon
commands that directors, consistent with their traditional fiduciary duties, act reasonably, by undertaking
a sound process to get the best deal available.") (internal quotation omitted).
158. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243. Some cases contemplate a third possibility, where no
active market check is required if the board can demonstrate "an impeccable knowledge of the market."
Id.
159. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595 ("[T]he level of judicial scrutiny under Revlon is
more exacting than the deferential rationality standard applicable to run-of-the-mill decisions governed
by the business judgment rule.").
160. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
161. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at
*11 (Del. Ch. 2013).
162. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242.
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duties."'63  Moreover, the board's decision need only be reasonable, not
perfect;'6 courts will not second-guess the decision simply because it would
have made a different decision or ex post events cast doubt on the merits of the
board's determination.'65
In sum, Revlon is simply a special case on the duties of care and loyalty.
Delaware jurisprudence recognizes that structuring a sale of the company is a
decision that requires substantial context-specific business judgment'66 and is
thus a matter best decided by the board. But heightened judicial oversight is
necessary to ensure that the board fulfills its obligations faithfully. In this
context, the court's fundamental objective in scrutinizing a transaction is to
determine whether the board was reasonably informed and appropriately
motivated when deciding how to conduct the sale.1 67
But the target board's discretion in structuring a sale of the company is not
as broad as it might initially seem. A separate line of cases, with its genesis in
the judicial scrutiny of takeover defenses, imposes an important limitation on
structured sales.
B. Legal Limits on Structured Sales: Unocal, Omnicare and the Fiduciary
Precommitment Constraint
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., a case decided the year prior to
Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court assessed the legality of defense
mechanisms adopted by the target board in the face of a hostile attempt to acquire
the company.'68 The Court announced a two-part test, in which the target board
must carry the burden of demonstrating: (1) that it had reasonable grounds to fear
a threat to the corporation, its shareholders, or to corporate policy and
163. Id. at 242-43 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989)).
164. Id. at 243 ("Directors' decisions must be reasonable, not perfect."); In re Plains
Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *4 (Del. Ch.
2013) (directors "are not required to show that they made a perfect decision, only a reasonable one").
165. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 ("If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives,
a court should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent
events may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business
judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a
range of reasonableness.").
166. See, e.g., id. ("[A] court should not ignore the complexity of the directors' task in
a sale of control.... The board of directors is the corporate decision making body best equipped to make
these judgments."). Part II describes in more detail the range of matters over which the board must exercise
its business judgment.
167. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at
*11 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("Revlon's reasonableness test also requires the Court to scrutinize the board's true
intentions to determine if the board is acting with the best interests of the stockholders in mind."); accord
Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 3337 (arguing that board motive is the animating feature of Revlon scrutiny).
168. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Defensive
mechanisms, in this context, are any devices that interfere with (or make more costly) a hostile (i.e., not
board-approved) acquisition of the company. Such devices include defensive recapitalizations (the crux
of the board's defense in Unocal), poison pills, and staggered boards.
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effectiveness;169 and (2) that the defensive measures employed were not
"draconian"l70 but were reasonable in relationship to the threat posed.17 1 In
subsequent cases, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the second prong of this
analysis and explained that target boards cannot take action that is either
"preclusive" or "coercive." 72 The former refers to defensive measures that fully
block a hostile bidder from gaining control of the target.173 The latter refers to
defensive measures that force stockholders to accept unwillingly or involuntarily
a management-sponsored alternative to the hostile bid.174 If the defensive
measure is either preclusive or coercive, it is impermissible.175 If not, the court
must still determine whether it was reasonable in relationship to the threat
posed. 176
The Unocal framework is animated fundamentally by the "omnipresent
specter," in cases where the company is threatened by a hostile takeover, that "a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders."177  Specifically, heightened scrutiny is
warranted because of the positional conflict faced by the board. In defending
against a takeover, the directors (and especially inside directors) might act
primarily out of a selfish desire to entrench themselves in office rather than out
of an honest belief that the prospective acquiror's offer was not in the best
interests of the firm.178
The Unocal framework intersects with Revlon in a peculiar way. An early
application of the Revlon standard is instructive and is quoted at length below.
The Delaware Supreme Court explained:
[W]hen several suitors are actively bidding for control of a corporation, the
directors may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process. When it
becomes clear that the auction will result in a change of corporate control, the
board must act in a neutral manner to encourage the highest possible price for
shareholders.. . Revlon is merely one of an unbroken line of cases that seek to
prevent conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers and acquisitions by
demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders.
169. Id. at 955.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). These
categories were intended to illuminate Unocal's rather abstract and unhelpful reference to "draconian"
defensive measures. Id. at 1386.
173. Id. at 1387; Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del.
2003) ("A response is 'preclusive' if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or
precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests or otherwise.").
174. Id. at 935 ("A response is 'coercive' if it is aimed at forcing upon stockholders a
management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer.").
175. Id.
176. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88.
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, at 954 (Del. 1985).
178. Id. at 955 (explaining that the "restriction placed upon a [takeover defense] is that




When multiple bidders are competing for control, this concern for fairness forbids
directors from using defensive mechanisms to thwart an auction or to favor one
bidder over another.179
Thus, if a plaintiff can show that the target board treated one or more
bidders on unequal terms, a slightly modified version of the two-part Unocal test
determines whether such disparate treatment is permissible.8 0 Specifically, the
courts carefully scrutinize whether the board "properly perceived that
shareholder interests were enhanced" by the disparate treatment of bidders and
then determine whether the discrimination was "reasonable in the relation to the
advantage sought to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular
bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests."'8 1
This convergence of Revlon and Unocal occurs most prominently in cases
where the target employs deal protection devices to favor a particular bidder. A
deal protection device is a contractual agreement between the target and a bidder
designed to increase the likelihood of consummating a transaction between the
two parties.182 Common deal protections include termination or breakup fees
(paid to the bidder in the event that the transaction is not consummated between
the bidder and target), lock-ups (in which the bidder has the right to obtain either
stock or assets from the target at below-market prices should the deal fall apart),
matching rights (which allow the bidder to match on equal terms any superior
offer), and various restrictions on the target's ability to seek out other buyers
after the agreement has been signed (e.g., "no-shop" provisions).8 3
While there are numerous variations, the basic principle behind all deal
protections is the same: they increase the cost of a topping bid that the board
would, as a matter of its fiduciary obligation, almost certainly be obliged to
accept. Acquirors request deal protections because there is substantial expense
associated with valuing a potential target, making a bid, and then preparing the
requisite contractual agreements between the parties.184 Absent deal protections,
first-movers would bear the information costs for a free-riding third party willing
to make incrementally small topping bids.'8 5 From the target's perspective, deal
protections are offered to a potential acquiror to induce it to make an initial bid.
At least in theory, targets employ deal protection devices because some potential
179. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989) (citation
omitted).
180. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988).
181. Id.
182. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 574.
183. Id. at 574-76.
184. Id. at 575 (noting that deal protection devices "are often justified as necessary to
compensate a friendly buyer for spending the time, money, and reputation to negotiate a deal with a target
when a third party ultimately wins the target").
185. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff& Christina A. Sautter, Lock-up Creep, 38 J. CORP.
L. 681, 682 (2013) ("A lock-up theoretically compensates a buyer for its investment costs in making an
initial bid for a target by making a second, competing bid more costly.").
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acquirors will not make initial bids without a measure of protection against
topping bids and/or compensation in the event that their deals are superseded.'"'
Targets also employ deal protections as carrots to coax higher bids out of
recalcitrant bidders in auctions in exchange for increased certainty of
consummating the deal. Both of the above results are, at least arguably, value-
maximizing for the shareholders.'87
Of course, targets might employ deal protection devices to lock up deals for
reasons unrelated to shareholder value. For example, the board might prefer a
particular acquiror for reasons of personal gain (e.g., a promise to retain the
incumbent board or management) or purely as a matter of personal animosity
and ego. Indeed, Revlon itself seems to have involved both. Chancellor Strine
remarked, "Revlon's CEO . . . appears to have preferred to continue running
Revlon but when it was clear that a sale would occur, wished to avoid selling to
Ron Perelman [the hostile bidder], a person the [Delaware] Supreme Court found
that [the Revlon CEO] disdained."18 8
If deal protections are sufficiently onerous, they might deter otherwise
available value-maximizing bids. The purpose of enhanced scrutiny in the deal
protection context is thus closely related to Revlon's core concern that the board
act loyally to seek the best possible value available for shareholders. Put
differently, we worry that the board members will protect or lock up a deal in
order to satisfy their own preferences rather than to maximize shareholder value.
Accordingly, enhanced scrutiny allows the court to "take a nuanced and realistic
look at the possibility that personal interests short of pure self-dealing have
influenced the board to block a bid or to steer a deal to one bidder rather than
another."l89
Delaware's superintendence of deal protections reached its apogee in the
Delaware Supreme Court's Omnicare decision, which formalized the fiduciary
precommitment constraint described above. In that case, a target in acute
financial distress sought a merger partner.190 After a multi-year search, with the
assistance of several expert advisors, the target identified only two plausible
acquirors: Omnicare and Genesis.191 Relatively early in the process, the target
had invited Omnicare to discuss a potential transaction, but Omnicare initially
offered only to purchase the target's assets in bankruptcy.19 2 That original
186. Id. at 693 ("Without the compensation lock-ups provide, there will theoretically
be fewer bids, as bidders will be hesitant to invest in making the first bid.").
187. Id. at 684-93 (surveying empirical literature on deal protections and lock-ups).
188. In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 n.174 (Del. Ch. 2010);
accord Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (noting that
Revlon's CEO had a "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman").
189. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598.
190. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 920 (Del. 2003).
191. Id. at 920-21.




proposal would have partially compensated the target's debtholders without
generating any value at all for the company's shareholders.193
The target then commenced negotiations with Genesis, which preliminarily
offered a transaction that would have provided recovery for both the target's
debtholders and shareholders.1 94 However, Genesis had a prior history with
Omnicare; the two companies were competitors, and Omnicare had recently
outbid Genesis in another takeover contest.195 Accordingly, Genesis informed
the target that it would not bear the cost of further due diligence and negotiating
a final deal unless the target agreed to fully lock up the transaction.196 The target
board, seeing no better deal on the horizon, agreed to exclusivity with Genesis.
The lock-up combined two statutorily authorized structures: the board agreed to
put the deal to a shareholder vote, regardless of whether it continued to
recommend the merger (a "force-the-vote" provision), and the majority
shareholders (who were also directors) agreed to vote in favor of the Genesis
deal.19 7 Thus, the transaction with Genesis was afait accompli, even in the face
of a superior offer.198 Unsurprisingly, Omnicare subsequently offered a
transaction that the board concluded was likely superior, and the target's
minority shareholders sued to enjoin the target's agreement with Genesis.'99
A majority of the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the deal
protections violated the board's fiduciary obligations. First, the majority held that
the deal protections did not pass muster under Unocal because they were both
preclusive and coercive: Omnicare was effectively precluded from making a
topping bid, and the target's minority shareholders were coerced into accepting
the Genesis deal insofar as they had no ability to vote down that transaction in
favor of Omnicare's higher bid.200 Second, and much more controversially,201
the majority asserted that, regardless of the board's motivations, the absolute
lock-up was a per se violation of the board's fiduciary obligations.2 02 According
to the majority, the board was legally obliged to include a "fiduciary out" clause
193. Id.
194. Id. at 922.
195. Id. at 923.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 925-26.
198. Id. at 936.
199. Id. at 927.
200. Id. at 935-36. While the former is trivially true, the latter conclusion is somewhat
puzzling insofar as the minority shareholders (who held only 35% of the total vote) would never get their
way in the event that the majority shareholders preferred a different transaction. Id. at 944-45 (Veasey, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also drew a distinction between deal protections adopted unilaterally by the board
to lock up a preferred deal (which could be deemed preclusive to other bidders) and those the board viewed
as necessary to induce a bid from "the only game in town." Id. at 943-44.
201. Indeed, Omnicare is one of the rare Delaware Supreme Court cases involving a
dissent. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 14, at 570 n.7 (arguing that the existence of a dissent "alone marks
Omnicare as an unusual and noteworthy case . . . ."); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in
Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 129 (1997) (noting that "[e]ven on deeply controversial
issues . . . Delaware's justices almost invariably speak with a single voice").
202. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936-39.
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in the Genesis agreement.203 Such clauses state, in sum, that the target board
reserves the right to cancel the agreement in the event that it subsequently
receives a better offer and determines that declining the superior offer would be
in violation of its fiduciary duty.204 The Court justified this conclusion on the
basis that, by pre-committing to the Genesis deal, "the [target] board disabled
itself from exercising its own fiduciary obligations at a time when the board's
own judgment is most important, i.e. receipt of a subsequent superior offer."205
Omnicare was criticized heavily by both academics and, curiously,
Chancery judges.206 While the Delaware Supreme Court has never expressly
overruled Omnicare, subsequent Chancery decisions have narrowed the scope of
its holding.207 In particular, these cases are highly critical of the notion that deal
protections can ever be invalid per se.208 In the post-Omnicare ra, the Chancery
Court has upheld most deal protection measures in cases where the deal is not
otherwise tainted by board self-interest.209 And yet, hints of Omnicare have
recently re-entered the judicial discourse in relation to a novel class of
precommitment devices known as standstills.
C Modern Developments: Standstill Agreements and Simulated FPSB Auctions
Deal protections have long been used midstream during takeover
negotiations with the intent of inducing a known counterparty to make its best
203. Id. at 938 ("We hold that the NCS board did not have authority to accede to the
Genesis demand for an absolute 'lock-up.' . . . Instead of agreeing to the absolute defense of the Genesis
merger from a superior offer, however, the NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to
protect the NCS stockholders if the Genesis transaction became an inferior offer.").
204. Id. The history and operation of fiduciary outs is described at length in Sabrina
Ursaner, Keeping 'Fiduciary Outs' Out of Shareholder-Proposed Bylaws: An Analysis of CA, Inc. v.
AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 479 (2010).
205. Omnicare, 818 A.2d, at 938.
206. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 127, Optima Int'l of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc.,
No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 13, 2008) (statement of Lamb, V.C.) ( "[I]t's really not my place to note
this, but Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality."); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 26 ("The court's
emerging hostility to precommitment strategies is puzzling."); Griffith, supra note 14, at 623 ("In short,
the Omnicare rule.is bad law, bad economics and bad policy."); Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is
Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit
Corollary to the Rule ofSchnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAW. 877, 902-03 (2005) (arguing that, at least
in some circumstances, absolute lock-ups should be adjudged equitable). But see J. Travis Laster,
Omnicare's Silver Lining, 38 J. CoP. L. 795, 796 (2013) (arguing that Omnicare "isn't all bad"); Brian
J.M. Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard, 38 J. CORP. L. 835, 837-42 (2013)
(offering a defense of Omnicare); Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does Its Status 10 Years
Later Tell Us?, 38 J. CoP. L. 865 (2013) (arguing that Omnicare's negative effects have been overstated).
207. See Davidoff& Sautter, supra note 185, at 702.
208. See, e.g., In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., CA. No. 6124-VCN,
2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (noting that "Delaware courts have repeatedly
recognized that [deal protection] provisions such as these . . . are not per se unreasonable, and do not alone
constitute breaches of fiduciary duty."); In re 3Com S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL
5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); In re Toys "R" Us S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch.
2005) (holding that neither termination fees nor matching rights-an agreement that the bidder have the
opportunity to match any superior bid-are invalid per se).
209. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 185 (surveying the cases and describing this




bid upfront. More recently, transaction planners have employed contractual
agreements with potential bidders in an effort to credibly commit ex ante to a
structured sale of the corporation. While there are many variations, the basic
pattern is as follows.
When a company is put up for sale, the target board generally retains one
or more investment bankers to advise it through the sales process.210 The board
and its advisors then identify plausible buyers and contact them to gauge their
interest in acquiring the target.211 Boone and Mulherin report that, on average,
companies that are interested in a competitive bidding process contact over
twenty potential acquirors.212 The target offers these potential acquirors access
to confidential information (financial or otherwise) that will assist in their
valuation process.213 In exchange for the target's confidential information,
bidders must execute confidentiality agreements that lmost always contain a
standstill provision.214 Standstills, in this context, bar the bidder from making a
public bid for the target for a set period of time after receiving the confidential
information.215 After a due diligence period, the target then requests final sealed
bids from the bidders that remain in the process.2 16 The winner is the highest
bidder, who must pay the price bid.
Standstills are thus mechanisms by which target boards can simulate FPSB
auctions.217 By contractually foreclosing losing bidders from making topping
bids, the target seeks to induce each participant to make its best offer21 8 because:
(i) if it is not the winning bidder, it will have no opportunity to make a subsequent
bid outside of the process; and (ii) if it is the winning bidder, it need not fear a
topping bid from another bidder with access to the target's confidential
information.
One particularly intricate form of standstill-termed the "Don't Ask, Don't
Waive" (DADW) standstill-not only bars losing bidders from making
subsequent opping bids, but also prevents them from asking the target board to
210. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4, at 849.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 852.
213. Id. at 849; Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill
Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 931 (2013).
214. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1034 (D. Ariz.
2002) ("'[I]n deals for public companies, it would be extraordinary for there not to be' a confidentiality
and standstill agreement.") (citation omitted).
215. See Sautter, supra note 213, at 932 (noting that standstills typically run for one to
two years from the date of signing). On average, approximately seven potential acquirors execute a
standstill in any given auction. See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 4, at 852.
216. Some sale structures contemplate a single round of bids; others involve multiple
rounds. See, e.g., Sautter, supra note 213, at 988.
217. The standstill structure only simulates a FPSB auction because third parties
outside the process, i.e., those that did not sign the standstill, can always make topping bids, but must do
so without the benefit of the target's confidential information.
218. See, e.g., Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling at 9, In re Complete
Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig.,C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
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waive that restriction.2 19 The rationale for the second constraint is that a losing
bidder could, instead of making a public bid outside of the process, hint to the
target board that it might be willing to make a topping bid. In the face of such a
request, the board's fiduciary obligations might require re-opening negotiations
with that losing bidder, which would destroy the integrity of (and any financial
benefits flowing from) the FPSB auction process. As previously noted, if the
target cannot credibly commit to the rules of the game, the bidders will treat the
process as an English auction.
While the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet opined on this matter,
several recent Chancery decisions provide conflicting guidance on the legality of
standstills and especially DADW standstills. In two early cases, neither of which
squarely confronted the question, the Chancery Court expressed deeply divided
views on DADW standstills. For his part, Chancellor (and now Chief Justice)
Strine was open to the possibility that such devices might pass muster in the
appropriate circumstances:
Contemplate, for example, a final round auction involving three credible, but now
tired bidders, who emerged from a broad market canvass. One can easily imagine
how a board striving in good faith to extract the last dollar they could for their
stockholders might promise the three remaining bidders that the top bidder at 8:00
p.m. on the next Friday will get very strong deal protections including a promise
from the target not to waive the Standstill as to the losers.220
On the other hand, in dicta during the approval of a settlement, Vice-Chancellor
Laster ventured that DADW standstills might be per se illegal. He opined that "it
is weird that people persist in the 'agree not to ask' in the standstill," and he
queried, "When is that ever going to hold up if it's actually litigated. . . ?"221
The Delaware Chancery Court addressed the legality of DADW standstills
more directly in two subsequent cases, which illustrate similar fault-lines among
the judges. In In re Complete Genomics, Inc., the target contacted over forty
potential buyers, of whom nine signed confidentiality agreements.222 Four of
those agreements contained standstill agreements, one of which-the contract
with "Party J"-included a DADW clause.2 2 3 Shortly after signing its agreement,
219. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 185, at 682 (describing DADW standstills).
220. In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 n.28 (Del. Ch. 2007).
221. In re RehabCare Grp., Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, tr. at 46 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 8, 2011). Vice Chancellor Parsons, too, expressed concerns. While he declined to adopt or
suggest a per se rule of invalidity, he highlighted the potential "informational vacuum" created by DADW
agreements (especially when combined with o er provisions that restricted the board's ability to inquire
about further interest from potential buyers). See In re Celera Corp. S'holders Litig, C.A. No. 6304-VCP,
2012 WL 1020471, at *21-22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).
222. Telephonic Ruling of the Court at 7, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder
Litig.,C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Nov. 9, 2012) (hereinafter Complete Genomics Ruling].
223. Complete Genomics Ruling at 8; Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's
Ruling at 12, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig.,C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Nov. 27, 2012)




Party J indicated that it had no intention of pursuing a transaction with the target
and ended communications with the target's board.224 The target received six
proposals and narrowed the field down to two bidders, who were asked to
provide their best and final bids.22 5 The target ultimately pursued a transaction
with BGI-Shenzen, which-among other things-agreed to let the CEO of the
target remain with the company and run it as an independent entity under BGI's
ownership.226
Plaintiff shareholders challenged the validity of the DADW agreement
relying explicitly on the notion that it was barred by the fiduciary precommitment
constraint.227 In a bench ruling, Vice Chancellor Laster enjoined the provision
without explicitly invoking Omnicare but instead relying on the key rationale
underlying that decision: board disablement as a result of a precommitment
strategy verged on per se illegality regardless of whether the sales process was
otherwise reasonable and well-motivated. Specifically, the Vice Chancellor held
that "the target board's agreement to disable itself from engaging in
dialogue with a potential acquiror under any circumstances whatsoever was the
legal equivalent of willful blindness."228 Accordingly, the "DADW [standstill]
represents a promise by a fiduciary to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a
promise that tends to induce such a violation."229
In In re Ancestry.com Shareholders Litigation, then-Chancellor Strine
issued a bench ruling that adopted a cautious, but more accommodating, view of
DADW standstills. The Chancellor disclaimed that such provisions were per se
illegal,230 but he advised that hey were potent devices, and thus needed to be
used with extreme caution.2 31 He then opined that DADW standstills might be
used appropriately to create a structured auction process with a definite end-
period:
224. Complete Genomics Oral Argument at 12.
225. Complete Genomics Ruling at 8.
226. Id. at 8-9.
227. Complete Genomics Oral Argument at 8 ("It is our view that under Omnicare, that
that is an improper impediment, an unreasonable impediment, on a potential bid for the company.
Omnicare says that it is unreasonable if it presents anyone from making a bid for the company. And that's
exactly what it does here.").
228. Id. at 15. Laster analogized the DADW agreement to the bidder-specific no-talk
clause that had been enjoined in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., C.A. Nos. 17398,
17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
229. Complete Genomics Oral Argument at 18.
230. Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Court's Ruling at 21, In re
Ancestry.com S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS ("I know of no statute, I know of nothing, that says that
these provisions are per se invalid. And I don't think there has been a prior ruling of the Court to that
effect. I know people have read a bench opinion that way.").
231. Id. at 22 ("1 think what Genomics and Celera both say, though, is Woah, this is a
pretty potent provision. And precisely because of this Schnell overlay, the equitable overlay of the law,
directors need to use these things consistently with their fiduciary duties, and they better be darn careful
about them.").
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[T]he value-maximizing purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-motivated
seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the people that it has brought into the
process the fact that the process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auction,
there is really an end to the auction for those who participate. And therefore, you
should bid your fullest because if you win, you have the confidence of knowing
you actually won that auction at least against the other people in the process.
232
In other words, DADW agreements might be legal if used to create FPSB
auctions.
The foregoing illustrates the deep divide within the Chancery Court
concerning the propriety of DADW standstills. Given this uncertainty, prominent
practitioners have cautioned against the use of DADW provisions.2 33 Moreover,
the shadow of Omnicare looms large.234 The Delaware Supreme Court has not
yet confronted this issue, but plaintiffs have already drawn analogies to the
absolute lock-up deemed per se illegal in that case.235
IV. A Principled Framework For The Judicial Oversight of Structured
Corporate Auctions
The preceding Parts demonstrate that: (i) FPSB auctions may, in the right
circumstances, generate higher revenues for the seller; (ii) determining whether
those circumstances exist requires the target board, along with its expert advisors,
to exercise substantial business judgment; and (iii) FPSB auctions require the
target board to credibly commit to the integrity of the process. If we assume a
232. Id. at 23.
233. See, e.g., Alan J. Stone & David Schwartz, NetSpend Board in Breach ofRevlon
Duties as Sale Process Is Determined Not to Be Designed to Produce Best Price, MILBANK, TWEED &
HADLEY LLP (May 30, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1983a812-6802-421d-
9c75-e33fc20714ea ("NetSpend . . . also reiterates the disdain Delaware courts have had for 'don't ask,
don't waive' clauses in standstill agreements, especially when such clauses are combined with restrictive
provisions in an acquisition agreement that reinforce their application. While the NetSpend decision
should not be read as a per se prohibition against the use of [DADW] clauses, practitioners should be very
wary of utilizing these provisions in the context of a sale process in which a board could be viewed as
willfully blinding itself to information."); Delaware Court of Chancery Holds That So-Called "Don'tAsk,
Don't Waive" Standstills Are Per Se Impermissible Under Delaware Law, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP
(Dec. 2013), http://www.1w.com/thoughtLeadership/RecentCourtofChanceryDecisionEnjoinsDontAsk
DontWaiveStandstills. ("We continue to believe that under appropriate facts and circumstances, a board,
acting through a majority of disinterested directors, in good faith and on an informed basis, can properly
determine that requiring potential bidders to acquiesce to a 'don't ask, don't waive' provision is in the
best interests of the company and its shareholders. We anticipate that the tension between that analytical
framework and a per se rule invalidating such provisions will be explored further through discussion
among M&A practitioners, including the Delaware bar, and through subsequent litigation testing the
limitations imposed by the Complete Genomics court on the use of such provisions."); Delaware Enjoins
"Don't Ask/Don't Waive" Standstill Provision, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Dec. 2012),
http://d4qxztsgsn706.cloudfront.net/images/content/l/3/v2/1340.pdf ("Overall, the court's decision [in
Complete Genomics], if widely followed, will probably spell the end of Don't Ask/Don't Waive
provisions at least as to private communications between prospective bidders and targets.").
234. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Specter ofOmnicare, 38 J. CoRP. L.
753, 768 (2013) ("Evidence of the continued vitality of Omnicare has recently arisen in the context of
standstill provisions.").
235. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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well-motivated target board, the use of standstills to simulate a FPSB auction is
thus well within the boundaries of Revlon's mandate.
But, of course, not all boards are properly motivated. This Part turns to the
question of the appropriate standard for judicial review and argues that Delaware
courts' skepticism about ex ante precommitment strategies is largely misplaced.
A per se rule of invalidity is entirely inappropriate, and the Unocal/Unitrin
standard is the wrong analytical tool by which to evaluate the target's chosen
auction structure. Instead, courts should assess the propriety of these devices on
a case-by-case basis, employing the traditional Revlon framework to ensure that
the board is adequately informed about how to structure the sale of the company,
properly motivated concerning the maximization of shareholder value, and
employs reasonable means to that end.
A. A Per Se Rule Barring the Precommitments Necessary for Structured Sales
Would Inappropriately Undermine Revlon's Foundational Policy
Outside of the few mandatory provisions set forth in the governing statute,
Delaware's model of corporate law eschews per se rules.236 Instead, transactions
are judged on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the board adhered to its
core duties of care and loyalty.237 Accordingly, even in the context of takeover
defenses and deal protection devices, the Delaware courts have repeatedly
advised that there are virtually no per se illegal structures.238
One important reason for this flexible, enabling approach is that per se rules
create the risk that a court will invalidate the actions of a well-informed board,
which acts honestly in furtherance of the shareholders' best interests.239 As Chief
Justice Veasey lamented in Omnicare, such rules give rise to "a judicially-
created 'third rail"' that unjustly limits the discretion of loyal fiduciaries.240 This
is dangerous not just in the abstract, but also because such limitations undermine
other well-established corporate law policies.
236. See Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Court's Ruling at 20-21,
In re Ancestry.com S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS ("Per se rulings where judges invalidate contractual
provisions across the bar are exceedingly rare in Delaware, and they should be. It's inconsistent with the
model of our law.").
237. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) ("The
beauty of the Delaware corporation law, and the reason it has worked so well for stockholders, directors
and officers, is that the framework is based on an enabling statute with the Court of Chancery and the
Supreme Court applying principles of fiduciary duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case basis.")
(Veasey, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
183 (Del. 1986) ("A lock-up is not per se illegal under Delaware law."); In re Toys "R" Us S'holder Litig.,
877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that neither termination fees nor matching rights are per se
illegal).
239. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 948 ("[T]he majority finds no breach of loyalty or care
but nonetheless anctions these directors for their failure to insist upon a fiduciary out as if those directors
had no regard for the effect of their otherwise disinterested, careful decision on others.") (Steele, J.,
dissenting).
240. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943 (Veasey, J., dissenting).
81
Yale Journal on Regulation
A per se rule invalidating DADW standstills or other mechanisms aimed at
fostering FPSB auctions would frustrate Revlon's core mandate: that the board
actively seek the best possible deal for shareholders. Consider a competitive
bidding situation with two bidders-a strong bidder that values the target at s and
a weak bidder with value w. The difference between these two values (s - w) is
the surplus up for grabs between the board and the strong bidder. If the target
board takes its Revlon obligations seriously, its role is not just to induce the
higher value bidder to make a topping bid (i.e., greater than w), but rather to
extract as much of the acquiror's surplus as possible.
Auction theory teaches that, in the right circumstances, FPSB sales can be
used to extract some of that surplus. As described above, a FPSB structure
requires the target to credibly commit to the rules of the game. Thus, a well-
informed, well-motivated board might reasonably conclude that it must employ
a contractual device-such as the standstill agreements discussed herein-to
make such a commitment. Such a board would not only have satisfied its duties
of care and loyalty, but may also have achieved Revlon's aspirational goal of
obtaining the best price for its shareholders. This goal is indeed aspirational
because there is no way to know with certainty whether, given some other
structure, a better deal might have been struck.2 4 1 For this very reason, Revlon
requires only a reasonable, not a perfect, decision.24 2
But a per se rule invalidating the precommitment devices necessary for
structuring a FPSB auction turns every competitive bidding process into a
standard English auction. Leaving aside that this, in itself, may deter some
bidders from participating in the process (and thus deprive the target of the
benefits of a competitive bidding situation),243 a mandatory English auction rule
constrains the board in large part to seeking a topping bid rather than competing
for the high bidder's surplus. The very notion of matching rights-a legal deal
protection device in which the then-winning bidder is contractually entitled to
match any future topping bid-is strong evidence of this point. Matching rights
are a signal from the winning bidder that money was left on the table, and that
they, at least plausibly, have ample surplus available to increase their bid but will
241. See In re Fort Howard Corp. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at
*722 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) ("Revlon explicitly recognized that a disinterested board may enter into
lock-up agreements if the effect was to promote, not to impede, shareholder interests. (That can only mean
if the intended effect is such, for the validity of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn upon how
accurately the board did foresee the future)."); accord In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573,
617 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("I tend toward the Fort Howard view of directors' ability to predict the future. . . .").
242. See, e.g., In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig. 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch.
2007) ("Our case law recognizes that [there] are a variety of sales approaches that might be reasonable,
given the circumstances facing particular corporations.").
243. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183 ("In this regard, we are especially mindful that some
lock-up options may be beneficial to the shareholders, such as those that induce a bidder to compete for
control of a corporation, while others may be harmful, such as those that effectively preclude bidders from
competing with the optionee bidder.") (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d




do so only if a topping bidder emerges.244 Put differently, the target board is
required to employ a structure that it may honestly believe is not likely to
generate the best deal for shareholders. Framed as such, it is hard to conclude
that the board has in all cases disabled itself in breach of its fiduciary obligations
by pre-committing.
Finally, the strongest economic argument in support of Omnicare's per se
rule is inapplicable to precommitments. Several commentators challenge
whether the "deal certainty" afforded by strong lock-ups truly creates value for
target shareholders.24 5 Briefly, they argue that if a board could in any
circumstance fully lock up a deal, bidders would regularly demand bulletproof
deal protection devices.246 Given the typical bargaining power in the takeover
market (recall that, on average, target corporations receive fewer than two public
bids and often engage in strategic transactions while in financial distress) and the
difficulty of determining whether a bidder will, in fact, walk away from a deal,
sellers are unlikely to be able to credibly resist these demands.2 4 7 Accordingly,
often these negotiations are structurally biased towards bidders, and in particular
the initial bidder, who has very little incentive to disclose much information
about its private valuation of the target.248 Put differently, sellers typically have
no way to determine how much deal certainty is actually worth to the bidder and
thus may systematically receive too little in exchange for foreclosing the
possibility of competitive bids.249 By taking fully locked-up deals off the table
as a matter of law, Omnicare's per se rule protects target shareholders by setting
an important and credible limit on the deal protections that are up for
negotiation.250
This rationale, however, lacks force with respect to the precommitments
necessary to structure FPSB auctions for three reasons. First, ex ante rules-of-
the-game precommitments do not create value by offering deal certainty. To the
contrary, they create value precisely by introducing an element of uncertainty
into the sales process and requiring bidders to make strategic decisions about
their bid strategy. Second, while lock-ups are intended to reduce the level of
competition, FPSB auctions can, in the right circumstances, increase the number
of entrants into the bidding process, which is a critical determinant of the seller's
revenue. 251 Third, Omnicare's defenders argue that allowing the possibility of a
full lock-up tilts the bargaining landscape too far in favor of bidders and
244. Of course, the winning bidder hopes the match-rights themselves are a sufficient
deterrence such that they need not be exercised. But the effectiveness of the deal protection device is
substantially diminished if the rights-holder cannot credibly signal its ability to exercise.
245. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 206, at 839-42; Laster, supra note 206, at 827-32.
246. Laster, supra note 206, at 832.
247. Quinn, supra note 206, at 839-40.
248. Id. at 840.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 841-42; Laster, supra note 206.
251. KLEMPERER, supra note 36, at 131 (noting that attractiveness of entry is one of
the few factors that "really matters in practical auction design").
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especially in favor of strong bidders that might try to obtain the target at a bargain
price by threatening to walk away from the deal. By contrast, strong bidders
would rarely, if ever, prefer a FPSB auction structure to an English auction due
to all of the incentive effects described in Part II above. Thus, the economic
rationale supporting Omnicare's per se rule fails to justify its application to the
precommitment devices necessary for structured auctions.
B. Revlon Alone Should Govern Neutral Ex Ante Structured Sales
Midstream deal protection devices are ordinarily governed by the Unocal
standard described in Part III. Unocal requires the target board to demonstrate a
cognizable threat to the corporation and only permits deal protections that are
neither preclusive nor coercive but are reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Superficially, the precommitment devices necessary for structured sales seem
analogous to deal protections; the target has agreed to "lock-up" a deal with the
winning bidder. The rules of the game may also include actual lock-ups, such as
promises to include termination fees or no-shops in the winning bidder's merger
agreement. Yet, there are two key differences between ex ante structured sales
and midstream deal protection devices that weigh strongly against employing the
same analytical framework to test their respective legality.
First, ex ante commitment devices, such as DADW standstills, are in most
cases facially neutral and thus do not create the positional conflict at the heart of
Unocal's enhanced scrutiny. Recall that Unocal is premised on the "omnipresent
specter" that the target board will deploy deal protection devices (or takeover
defenses) for self-interested reasons.252 For example, the target board may prefer
a deal with a counterparty that promises to let board members remain in office,
offers lucrative side deals, or, as in Revlon itself, appeals to a constituency other
than the shareholders in an effort to shield the incumbent board from impending
litigation.253
252. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Omnicare,
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 943 n.102 (Del. 2003) ("The basis for the Unocal doctrine is
the "omnipresent specter" of the board's self-interest to entrench itself in office.") (Veasey, J., dissenting);
Griffith, supra note 14, at 619 ("What else is the 'omnipresent specter' other than an increased risk that
the board is putting another interest (its own) ahead of the interests of its shareholders?").
253. In re Topps Co. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("When directors
bias the process against one bidder and toward another not in a reasoned effort to maximize advantage for
the stockholders, but to tilt the process toward the bidder more likely to continue current management,
they commit a breach offiduciary duty."); In re Toys "R" Us S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000-01 (Del.
Ch. 2005) ("Nor does a board's decision to sell a company prevent it from offering bidders deal
protections, so long as its decision to do so was reasonably directed to the objective of getting the highest
price, and not by a selfish or idiosyncratic desire by the board to tilt the playing field towards a particular
bidder for reasons unrelated to the stockholders' ability to get top dollar."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (finding that "[t]he principal benefit [of the lock-
up] went to the directors, who avoided personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the board owed
no further duty under the circumstance . . ."); cf Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. I10, 118 (1965) ("When we find incumbents recommending a control change,




By contrast, a credible ex ante commitment to conduct a structured sale
does not conjure the same omnipresent specter. True, the target has "locked-up"
a deal with the winner, but that winner is unknown to the board at the time of the
lock-up. Operating behind a veil of ignorance, there is substantially less chance
that the board has forgone a better deal for the shareholders as a result of its own
self-interest.254 This neutrality is precisely what Revlon and its progeny
command:
[W]hen several suitors are actively bidding for control of a corporation, the
directors may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process . . . When
it becomes clear that the auction will result in a change of corporate control, the
board must act in a neutral manner to encourage the highest possible price for
shareholders.255
By way of comparison, consider the Povel and Singh proposal described in
Part I. They suggest that the optimal sales structure involves a take it or lose it
proposition to a strong bidder, where the threat is that if the strong bidder does
not offer enough, she will either have to compete in a FPSB auction with a
minimum bid, or the target will be sold to a weak bidder at a lower price.25 6 This
mechanism may indeed be optimal, either as a mathematical construct or in real-
life circumstances. However, even leaving aside the risks associated with the
board improvidently (but accidentally) selecting an inappropriate "strong
bidder," the potential for agency costs is enormous. Because the board knows in
advance to which bidder they will offer a lock-up, there is a real risk that the
board members will make that choice to advance their own personal interests.
Such a structure thus implicates the positional conflict animating Unocal; neutral
ex ante structured sales do not.
Second, Unocal relies on two concepts-preclusion and coercion-as a
screen for impermissible board action. But those concepts fit awkwardly with ex
ante contractually structured sales. Preclusion refers to the situation where a
bidder is wholly barred from making a superior proposal. But, in the context of
standstills, any such preclusive effect is entirely voluntary. If the bidder does not
wish to be bound by the standstill, it need not sign it. Moreover, it is only limited
from making topping bids if it operates outside of the structured sales process. It
can unilaterally avoid this restriction by making its best offer pursuant o the
254. For a similar reason, Chief Justice Veasey argued that it was debatable that Unocal
even applied to the fact pattern presented by Omnicare. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943 n.102 (arguing
that "[t]he Unocal doctrine applies to unilateral board actions that are defensive and reactive in nature.")
(Veasey, C.J., dissenting); accord id at 948 ("The contract terms that NCS' board agreed to included no
insidious, camouflaged side deals for the directors or the majority stockholders nor transparent provisions
for entrenchment or control premiums.") (Steele, J., dissenting).
255. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (emphasis
added).
256. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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rules of the game. In sum, if used appropriately, DADW standstills preclude only
opportunistic behavior that deprives the target of the benefits of a structured sale.
Coercion, too, is an ungainly construct with which to measure board
conduct vis-A-vis structured sales. In this context, coercion refers to
management's efforts to force a particular transaction upon shareholders in the
face of a hostile alternative. Within the structured sale process, however, there
can be no hostile alternative unless the losing bidders breach their own
contractual obligations.2 57 Moreover, if the process is ex ante neutral,
management is not forcing any particular transaction upon shareholders; it is
simply setting the rules of the game that determine which proposal the
shareholders will ultimately vote upon. All that is forced on shareholders is the
structure of the process itself, but that decision is squarely within the board's
authority under Delaware law. 258 In sum, Unocal is an inapt framework for the
judicial review of facially neutral ex ante commitment devices used to enforce
the rules of the game in a structured sale.
C. Applying Revlon to Simulated FPSB Auctions
None of the foregoing suggests that standstills or other methods of
simulating FPSB auctions are beyond judicial review or even subject only to the
business judgment rule. I am only arguing that Revlon alone-as a special case
of the board's duties of care and loyalty-should govern.
Revlon requires the court to engage in enhanced scrutiny to determine
whether the board was adequately informed concerning its chosen sales process
and whether the board was properly motivated in designing a process aimed at
achieving the best price for shareholders.259 It is impossible to cover the field
with respect to how any given transaction might run afoul of those precepts.
However, there are several threshold issues of general applicability that are worth
highlighting.
First, the board should be fully informed about its own structured process.
In particular, the directors should understand exactly how the standstill (with or
without a DADW provision) contributes to that process and the limitations those
agreements place on participants. Potent precommitments should not be adopted
pro forma. For example, Vice Chancellor Glasscock appropriately chastised a
257. Of course, if a party outside the structured sale wishes to make a proposal without
access to the confidential material, it is free to do so. The standstills and DADW agreements only restrict
parties who voluntarily signed them. Target boards would be well-advised to ensure that they can feasibly
consider the merits of any such outside offers.
258. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,45 (Del.
1994) ("The board of directors is the corporate decision making body best equipped to make these
judgments."). In any event, particularly cautious boards could submit their proposed auction structure to
the shareholders for pre-approval. I thank Frank Gervurtz for this suggestion.
259. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL
2181518, at *1l (Del. Ch. 2013) ("Revlon requires the Court to look to the directors' true intentions to
determine if the directors have been motivated by the appropriate desires: i.e., to achieve the highest price




target board where "the Board did not consider, or did not understand, the import
of the DADW clauses and of their importation into the Merger Agreement."260
He found the target's process unreasonable:
In order to fulfill its fiduciary duty to construct a sales process reasonably
designed to maximize value, the action of the Board must be informed, and
"logical and reasoned." Nothing in the record indicates that the retention by the
Board of the DADW provisions, or in the Board's importation of the provisions
in the Merger Agreement, was informed, logical and reasoned.26 1
Similarly, targets that engage in lengthy sales processes should ensure that
legacy confidentiality agreements do not interfere with or improperly restrict any
subsequent auctions. If an earlier, but aborted, sales process involved standstills,
the target should carefully consider whether those agreements hould either be
waived and/or whether the restricted parties hould be re-invited to submit bids
in connection with the re-convened auction.262
Second, DADW standstills or any other form of particularly restrictive
standstill should only be employed if the target actually intends to simulate a
FPSB auction. Given the potency of these clauses, there is a real danger that a
poorly motivated board may bind plausible bidders to a DADW standstill and
then shut them out of the process entirely by pursuing a negotiated deal with a
preferred acquiror. 263 In other words, targets should not use standstills
discriminatorily.
Third, the court must assess whether the rules of the auction are in fact
neutral, in the sense that they do not improperly favor a particular bidder. For
example, a precommitment device that required the target board to take the
highest bid offered by any private equity firm may well create a positional
conflict if the board knows that only one such entity is a plausible bidder. Courts
should be wary of collusive dealings masquerading as neutral precommitments.
Additionally, courts must be sensitive to non-financial criteria, such as regulatory
constraints, feasibility of financing, structure of consideration, and the like, that
a target might use to limit the pool of potential bidders.
Finally, the target should ensure that its potential bidder pool is sufficiently
deep. If the board is going to commit to do a deal with the winner of the auction,
then the participants should reflect the board's reasonable good faith judgment
about the most plausible acquirors. This is especially true if the winning bidder
260. Id. at *19.
261. Id.
262. Id. at * 19 n.235 ("Given that the clauses here are merely an artifact from an earlier
Board strategy (to remain an independent entity), and given that they are here employed to lock up a single
bidder sale, none of that utility can apply here.").
263. Somewhat speculatively, this dynamic may well have been the cause of Vice
Chancellor Laster's concerns in Complete Genomics, insofar as it narrowed the field down to two bidders,
one of whom-indeed, the ultimate counterparty-promised to let the target's CEO keep his job. See
supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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is promised additional deal protections over and above the DADW standstill
restrictions on the losing bidders. Of course, a well-motivated board has a built-
in incentive to get this aspect of the transaction right; in order to credibly commit
to the auction process, the board must assure potential bidders that there is not
likely to be a topping bid made by an unrestricted thirdparty. Accordingly, the
court should carefully scrutinize the pre-auction market solicitation process if a
target employs a DADW standstill coupled with back-end deal protections.26 4
Conclusion
Auction theory teaches that certain precommitments are necessary for
conducting value-maximizing sales. This lesson should inform Delaware
takeover jurisprudence, which mandates that the board act to maximize
shareholder value when a corporation is put up for sale. Yet, Delaware law
continues to exhibit unwarranted hostility to precommitments, and, in doing so,
it undermines its own foundational principles of fiduciary duty.
Building on modem advances in auction theory, this Article proposes a
principled framework for adjudicating precommitments in the takeover context.
Delaware courts should distinguish between two categories of precommitment
devices: (i) ex ante precommitments, such as rules-of-the-game precommitments
in the course of a corporate auction where the target is legitimately ambivalent
about the identity of its ultimate transaction partner; and (ii) midstream or ex post
precommitments such as deal protection devices, in which the target locks up a
transaction with a known counterparty.
Adopting the framework set forth herein would harmonize the two
presently paradoxical policy considerations that underlie Delaware's takeover
jurisprudence: value maximization and fiduciary loyalty. Neutral ex ante
precommitments allow boards to conduct value-maximizing sales while at the
same time avoiding the positional conflict that animates Delaware's current
antipathy towards precommitments. These devices should not be governed by
the unduly restrictive standards set forth in Unocal and Omnicare, but instead
subjected to the enhanced scrutiny contemplated in Revlon. Thus, courts need
not, and should not, defer entirely to the board's business judgment. Instead,
enhanced scrutiny of precommitments, by assessing both the reasonableness of
the board's chosen sales structure and the directors' good faith, would allow the
courts to ensure that the board has satisfied its duties of care and loyalty.
264. Of course, modest back-end deal protections-such as termination fees-can
serve a salutary function in structured sales. If a bidder concludes that it can make an informed valuation
of the target without signing the standstill, it may voluntarily stay out of the target's chosen sales process
in an attempt to avoid the incentive effects that accompany that process. If enough bidders are able to do
so, the auction itself collapses. By offering the winner of the target's chosen process appropriate deal
protections, potential bidders are encouraged to participate in the structured process.
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